By Matija Šerić
The largest CIA mission in terms of delivering weapons, military equipment, logistics, and funding was a global supply line for the mujahideen, the “holy warriors” of Afghanistan, who were fighting against approximately 110,000 Soviet troops.
Under the evocative name “Operation Cyclone,” this secret program officially began during President Jimmy Carter’s administration in January 1980, although covert support had started earlier. Since it was Carter’s idea, CIA Director William Casey was not initially enthusiastic. However, he soon saw a major opportunity for the Agency to strengthen its influence over U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.
CIA’s Motives for Involvement
“I was the first chief of station ever sent out with this wonderful order: Go kill Soviet soldiers,” said Howard Hart, a prominent CIA official who arrived in Afghanistan in 1981. “Imagine that. I was thrilled. It was a noble goal. But the mission was never about liberating Afghanistan. Nobody believed the Afghans could truly win.”
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the CIA provided extensive support to the mujahideen. The primary goal was to inflict as much damage as possible on Soviet forces, forcing them to withdraw from this vast and troubled Asian country. Additionally, by supporting Islamist fighters, the CIA hoped to destabilize Soviet republics with large Muslim populations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Russian regions like Chechnya), potentially sparking unrest and contributing to the internal collapse of the Soviet Union.
Soviet Motives for Intervention
Communists took power in Kabul in the spring of 1978, but fierce internal struggles between the Khalq and Parcham factions, combined with uprisings from various tribes and groups, threatened the regime’s survival. Among the rebels, the mujahideen were the most vocal. On Christmas 1979, to preserve the communist government, the USSR intervened militarily and quickly occupied most of the country.
The Soviet leadership, under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, KGB chief Yuri Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, believed that the collapse of the Afghan communist government would jeopardize Soviet geopolitical interests in the region, particularly given Afghanistan’s strategic role as a buffer zone toward South and West Asia.
The Soviets also feared that instability could lead to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into neighboring Soviet republics with significant Muslim populations. Although they justified their intervention as an “international duty” to support a socialist country, the real motive was to preserve the Soviet sphere of influence in Asia amid the Cold War rivalry with the United States.
America’s Response
A decade-long war followed, during which Western governments, particularly the United States, provided extensive support to the Afghan rebels. President Jimmy Carter announced the so-called Carter Doctrine, declaring that the United States would defend its interests in the Persian Gulf, including the use of military force if necessary.
Immediately after the Soviet invasion, Carter imposed sanctions on the USSR, promised assistance to Pakistan, and pledged to protect the Gulf states due to their critical role in supplying oil to America. The United States and other Western countries also boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Carter’s administration increased the U.S. military presence in the region and strengthened ties with partners such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to counter Soviet influence.
The Carter Doctrine continued under President Ronald Reagan, turning the war in Afghanistan into a key element of the Cold War confrontation. This made the CIA’s covert support program for the mujahideen a mission of immense significance.
The Scale of Operation Cyclone
Operation Cyclone was one of the longest-running covert operations in CIA history, lasting 13 years from 1979 to 1992. In 1979, its budget was around $500,000, growing to $20–30 million the following year, and reaching an astonishing $630 million by 1987. Under President Reagan, the program expanded further, with a total estimated value of around $3 billion.
However, the actual value of the operation was even higher when accounting for additional funding from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia saw in the mujahideen an opportunity to export its radical form of Islam—Wahhabism. Total support for the mujahideen is estimated at $6–8 billion, including funds for arms purchases, weapons, military equipment, logistics, training, and operational costs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This made Operation Cyclone one of the most expensive covert operations in history.
The Reagan Doctrine
The policy of aiding the mujahideen aligned with the Reagan Doctrine, a U.S. foreign policy strategy during the 1980s that aimed to support anti-communist movements worldwide to weaken Soviet influence. The doctrine sought to assist people in the Third World fighting against Soviet-backed regimes. Beyond aiding the Afghan mujahideen, the CIA also supported the Contras in Nicaragua and rebel forces in Angola and Cambodia.
President Reagan believed that supporting these insurgencies would accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to the end of the Cold War and the rise of American global dominance. To implement this doctrine, Reagan relied on the CIA’s Special Activities Division, which equipped and trained rebel forces. A young CIA officer, Michael Vickers, was the architect of this strategy, which involved supplying a wide array of weapons, logistical support, and training programs to strengthen the mujahideen’s capacity to wage a successful war against Soviet occupiers.
The Critical Role of Pakistan
The operation heavily depended on Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, which served as an intermediary for distributing funds, weapons, and equipment. It is estimated that the ISI armed and equipped over 100,000 rebels between 1978 and 1992, while also encouraging Arab volunteers to join the Afghan resistance.
The U.S. and Pakistani governments focused their support on Sunni mujahideen groups, avoiding Shia factions due to tensions with the Islamic Republic of Iran. CIA and U.S. government officials frequently visited the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the U.S. provided significant humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees.
CIA Director William Casey even proposed that Pakistan exert pressure by taking the fight into Soviet territory, particularly in the Muslim-majority southern republics. Pakistan agreed, and the CIA soon provided thousands of Qurans, texts on Soviet atrocities against Afghans, and pamphlets about local historical heroes to support the ideological aspect of the struggle.
Contributions from Saudi Arabia and Other Nations
From the start, Saudi Arabia matched the CIA’s financial contributions to the Islamist rebels dollar for dollar. When Saudi payments were delayed, U.S. officials would fly to Riyadh to expedite the flow of funds. China also contributed by sending millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, alongside Egypt and Britain (through MI6).
China viewed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its security and regional stability, especially given the proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border. Chinese aid to the mujahideen included weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment, which was routed through Pakistan.
