By Bruno Rukavina
This analysis explores the concept of a (multi)vector (eng. multi-vectoral) international system in contrast to the conception of a (multi)polar (eng. multi-polar) international system. The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate what a multivector international order is as opposed to multipolarity, and how it can be implemented in the foreign policy of states. The analysis is a continuation and upgrade of a very interesting study by Dr. sc. Sanja Vujačić on “peace on credit,” in which she partially analyzes this concept (Vujačić, 2026).
Definition and the Role of Poles in International Relations
To better understand international relations, it can sometimes be useful to draw on the natural sciences, although they alone cannot adequately explain international relations, since at their center is the human being, who does not behave according to mathematical–natural laws, but according to his own imperfect laws that arise from humanity’s fallen nature. Regardless, throughout the 20th century concepts from physics were often used to describe international relations, with one of the most frequently used terms being the pole.
What is a pole? Etymologically, it comes from the Greek word pólos, meaning axis or pivot, and in physics it is most often used in relation to magnets as “the point or points on a magnet in which the largest part of the magnetic flux is concentrated” (Croatian Language Portal, 2026). In international relations, a pole can be viewed as an actor possessing the sum of three types of power (political, economic, and military), along with population and territory. “Geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geostrategy can be represented through a trigonal relationship in which the two lower corners of the triangle remain constant (population and territory), while the level of power changes depending on the type of power: political power (geopolitics), economic power (geoeconomics), and military power (geostrategy)” (Rukavina, 2022: 93).
Interesting conclusions can be reached by summing these three triangles. Territory and population remain the same base or foundation (multiplied three times), and when military, economic, and political power are added, together they form what Russian geopoliticians call a pole of the multipolar world. “Each pole of the multipolar world, in theory, should have a strong military, economic, demographic, political, geographical, and civilizational formation capable of achieving strategic integration, acting as a resultant across a wide spectrum of regional interests with neighboring territories” (Dugin, 2017: 62). A pole in international relations can thus be defined as a large territory with a significant population and a sufficient level of military, economic, and political power, clearly distinguishable by its internal structure from another pole (Rukavina, 2022: 94).
A pole in international relations denotes a concentration of multidimensional power around a single actor (most often a state or a narrow group of states) that is powerful enough to enable autonomous strategic aggregation, action, and the ability to shape the rules, norms, and outcomes of the international system, rather than merely reacting and adapting to existing circumstances. Such power includes military-security, economic, political-institutional, and normative-ideological capacities, with the larger state within the pole acting as a center of gravity toward which other actors orient themselves through alliances, dependencies, or balancing. Poles thus create structural (a)symmetries in international relations and form the basis for distinguishing between unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar international orders. Poles are, in effect, blocs of states that gravitate toward some form of center, creating within blocs a center–periphery structure that often benefits the center at the expense of the periphery.
In other words, polarity establishes a certain hegemony over a clearly defined area, as was the case during the Cold War, when there were clear boundaries and lines of division that split continents (Europe), states (Germany), and even cities (Berlin). Poles/blocs had clear ideological and politico-economic systemic/organizational differences. This leads to an interesting question: what ideological or systemic-organizational differences can we speak of today? How is capitalist Russia different from capitalist Germany or Denmark, or from the capitalist United States, when in all these countries the same rule applies, as shown by almost all economic and financial studies: the rich will always get richer and the poor poorer? Perhaps this is a matter of constructivism and institutional isomorphism, which is a separate research topic.
The Role and Importance of Vectors in International Relations
The etymological meaning of vector comes from the Latin word vector, meaning carrier, derived from vehere, to carry (Croatian Language Portal, 2026). “The concept of the vector developed from the theory of oriented or directed line segments. An oriented segment AB is a segment AB with a defined starting point A and ending point B, graphically represented by an arrow from A to B” (Croatian Encyclopedia, 2026). What does this signify for international relations and foreign policy/diplomatic action?
The etymological and mathematical meaning of the vector proves particularly applicable to political analysis of international relations, as a vector denotes a directed course of foreign policy that has a clear starting point grounded in the national interests, identity, and resources of state A (point A), and a specific direction toward concrete other states B, C, D…, with the relationship being measurable and expressed through political, military, economic, or normative levels of engagement. Analogous to an oriented segment in mathematics, defined by a starting and an ending point, a foreign policy vector is determined by where a state starts (point A) and toward which state its policy is directed (point B). The etymological meaning of the Latin vehere (to carry) symbolizes the transfer of power, interests, influence, or values between the political spaces of states A and B.
Such vectors do not operate in isolation but simultaneously; they can complement, reinforce, or cancel each other out, be complementary or contradictory. This allows foreign policy to be analyzed as a dynamic set of directed relationships rather than as static and passive alignment with poles or blocs, as was common in the previous century. Thus, the concept of the vector in international relations denotes a structured, directed, and intensive form of foreign policy action by a state, which is particularly evident in the concept of multivector foreign policy.
Consequences of Distinguishing Poles and Vectors in International Relations
The practical implication of distinguishing between poles and vectors in international relations lies in separating the structural constraints of a polar international system from the more open operational choices of individual states’ foreign policies through vectors, thereby enabling more realistic foreign policy strategies. Poles represent relatively stable concentrations of multidimensional power that define the framework of action, the limits of what is possible, and the hierarchy of the international system, while simultaneously constraining states within those poles/blocs. Vectors, on the other hand, denote concrete, directed, and changeable relations and policies that states (point A) develop in free (inter)action with other states (points B, C, D…).
In practical terms, this means that a state does not necessarily have to identify with any pole in order to maintain a strong or intensive vector of cooperation with it; cooperation can take place with a state that is (self-)perceived as a pole carrier. The distinction between poles and vectors allows foreign policy to be analyzed as a dynamic process of managing different relationships with varying intensity, rather than through simplified bloc alignment. This is especially important for small and medium-sized states which, although they cannot be poles themselves, can rationally optimize their position through selective direction and balancing of vector relations with different states, independently of poles. In practice, this opens space for more flexible, adaptive, and less escalatory foreign policy strategies, as the multivector approach enables the preservation of autonomy, national sovereignty, and the maximization of national interests within the given structural constraints of the international order.
The bloc-based division of the world into poles traps states and views them as passive pieces within those blocs. Once in a bloc, a state is under its influence, which simplifies international relations that are in reality far more dynamic and complex than bloc-based arrangements suggest. Viewing the international order as a system of states striving for security and the realization of their national interests (whether clearly defined or, as in Croatia’s case, undefined in official documents) through free international action is much closer to a multivector understanding of international relations than to a bloc-based one.
Moreover, at times the main carriers of blocs (stronger and larger states) may have opposing or threatening national interests toward other (smaller and medium-sized) states within the same bloc. The recent crisis over Greenland between the United States as the main carrier of the Euro-Atlantic bloc (or pole) and Denmark as a smaller state within that bloc (pole) illustrates this well. Therefore, multivector foreign policy directs state action toward its own national interests in relations with any other states that contribute to achieving those interests. Continuing the previous example, Denmark could have created a vector relationship with any other actor to protect its interests in Greenland, just as Canada directed its foreign policy toward China to compensate through a foreign policy vector for negative relations with the United States. Or consider India, which has cooperation agreements with the EU, the United States, and Russia, while at the same time being part of the Commonwealth with the United Kingdom. This raises the question of which pole/bloc India belongs to—or whether poles no longer exist at all, and we are instead witnessing a non-polar international order in which actors pragmatically pursue multivector foreign policies.
Multivector foreign policy must be flexible and adaptable to changes in the international environment and focused on those foreign economic and foreign policy vectors that are feasible and beneficial for a given state at a given time. Since political tensions between states are generally not permanent, it is important to maintain constant bilateral relations even under unfavorable political conditions in order to preserve long-term economic, security, and political national interests (Petrov-Rudakovsky, 2023: 81). According to the scholarly literature, multivector foreign policy is characteristic of almost all post-Soviet states. “Most members of the CIS belong to medium and small states (except the Russian Federation, which is large), so it is not surprising that all have chosen some form of multivectorism in their foreign policy: from the open-door policy in Tajikistan to complementarism in Armenia and permanent neutrality in Turkmenistan” (Degterev et al., 2018: 63). “Multivector policy is to some extent characteristic of many post-Soviet states” (Yuneman, 2023). Kazakhstan is often cited as an example because “Tokayev, who served as foreign minister from 1994 to 1999 and again from 2003 to 2007, helped establish Kazakhstan’s uniquely branded multivector foreign policy. This strategy emphasizes good external relations with all major regional and global powers” (O’Neill et al., 2023: 5). Multivector foreign policy represents an operational strategy through which states, within the given structural constraints of the international system, flexibly direct various foreign policy and foreign economic relations in accordance with their own national interests, without necessary or permanent attachment to a single pole or bloc.
Given the increasingly dynamic multivector relations in international affairs, multipolarity—highlighted by numerous authors and politicians—may be replaced by non-polarity, as discussed in our writing last year. “We are witnessing the transformation or (according to some authors) the collapse of unipolar hegemony and the final end of the Americanized international order (Pax Americana), which nevertheless persists for some time in a transformational phase, as institutions such as the UN still exist. The potential withdrawal or weakening of the United States in its role as global arbiter leaves behind a power vacuum. In such an environment, in the short term, no power possesses sufficient capacity or political will to assume leadership, resulting in the creation of an interspace without rules, norms, and structures. Therefore, it can be argued that chaos results in a temporary non-polar international order in certain parts of the world” (Rukavina, 2025a; Evstafyev, 2023). “There is no polarity at all; we live in a world of chaotic non-polarity” (Actualitica, 2025). It is precisely this non-polarity (an international order without a single pole), which is becoming increasingly evident, that opens the door to a multivector international order within which the Republic of Croatia must begin to (re)position itself, primarily by focusing on its own national interests and its own national vision and mission for 2050 and 2100.
Croatia in a Multipolar and/or Multivector International Order
It is less well known that Croatia defined the existence of a multipolar world order in its official strategic documents as early as eight years ago. This is found in the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for 2018–2020, demonstrating that Croatia recognized early the changes occurring at strategic global levels. The mission of the Ministry at that time was defined as follows:
“In the new multipolar world, and in the context of a new multipolar order in Europe, the mission of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia in the period 2018–2020 is to promote stability in the immediate environment; promote and protect the interests and security of Croatian citizens and members of the Croatian people outside the Republic of Croatia; serve the interests of the Croatian economy abroad; strengthen the Central European and Mediterranean dimension of Croatian foreign policy; preserve and develop mechanisms of stability and cohesion within the European Union; and, in accordance with Croatian interests and the spirit of international cooperation, develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other states in the world” (Strategic Plan, 2018).
As a small state in a multipolar world, Croatia is not a pole; it lacks sufficient military, economic, or political power to independently shape global rules and the structure of the international system. This means that it is structurally constrained by the relations and actions of great powers—the centers of poles—and must take into account the hierarchy of power that defines the framework of possible action within that pole or bloc. For Croatia, multipolarity represents a foreign policy context in which various bloc centers of power exist, among which it is necessary to maintain developed and balanced interests and relations, but which simultaneously hinders the easy creation of relations with states outside that pole/bloc, as blocs do not allow strategic balancing based on national interests, but rather demand bloc obedience.
However, a multivector approach allows Croatia to rise above the bloc framework and proactively direct its own foreign policy vectors toward different states around the world (diplomatically, economically, security-wise, and culturally), focusing on those states and actors that can contribute to the realization of Croatian (currently undefined) national interests. Such a policy is not passive alignment or blind obedience within a bloc or pole, but flexible, proactive, and selective management of multiple parallel vector relationships. In this way, Croatia can develop strong cooperation within the EU and NATO while simultaneously maintaining constructive, pragmatic economic or cultural ties with other states, provided such cooperation serves Croatian national interests.
In practice, this means that Croatia, although not a pole itself, uses foreign policy as a set of vectors to maximize autonomy and sovereignty, ensure security, stimulate economic and political development, and fulfill national interests that must be defined in new strategic and doctrinal state documents. The multivector approach enables strategic maneuvering and balancing, avoiding dependence on a single foreign center of power, with a focus on Croatia’s own growth and development in an increasingly anarchic, dynamic, and chaotic international environment.
Political specialist Bruno Rukavina is an expert in foreign policy and diplomacy and a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.
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