By Bruno Rukavina

Different Calculations and Predictions of Realists before the Meetings

Predictions and calculations in international relations are extremely difficult due to the high degree of contingency rooted in the unpredictability of human nature. For those who have been active in politics or still are, they know that a summit meeting does not take place unless something has already been agreed upon beforehand, or if certain matters need to be discussed more seriously in person, not through intermediaries and negotiators. In this context, one can also view the meeting between the American and Russian presidents in Alaska.

For months now, secret and sometimes even open U.S.-Russian negotiations have been taking place around the world, with Ukraine being only one of the items on the agenda. Before President Trump, as emphasized at the meeting, U.S.-Russian relations were at their lowest level since the Cold War, and it was necessary to address numerous bilateral issues—such as the functioning of diplomatic missions—but also to try to understand (and explain) Russian and American interests and positions regarding conflicts and crises around the world. Months of diplomatic work culminated in an almost three-hour-long summit meeting between the Russian and American delegations.

Among the many analysts and experts who predicted different outcomes of the meeting, it is best to highlight the arguments of the one who came closest to foreseeing its outcome—once again, American professor John Mearsheimer (who speaks primarily from the realist theoretical framework, from which his high rate of accurate predictions in international relations likely stems). (Let us recall that in 2014, Professor Mearsheimer gave a lecture in which he predicted today’s conflict in Ukraine if it continued its rapprochement with NATO.)

The arguments that Professor John Mearsheimer anticipated regarding the U.S.-Russian meeting in Alaska can be summarized as follows:

• Shadow play – The Russian and American positions are vastly different. Russia has set clear conditions for ending the conflict, which Ukraine, Europe, and much of Trump’s circle, as well as many American politicians (and U.S. state institutions), categorically reject. Therefore, a direct summit meeting was convened to retreat into the shadows of Alaska, away from all the categorical anti-peace positions in Europe, Ukraine, and the U.S.
• The meeting as an attempt to cover up Trump’s failed attempt to impose secondary sanctions on China and India. The sanctions were scheduled for August 8, so Trump sent Steve Witkoff to arrange the meeting, which consequently delayed the sanctions. The sanctions would have only drawn China and India closer to Russia, while also negatively affecting the U.S.
• Russia continues advancing in Ukraine, which strengthens its negotiating position and weakens the West’s. At present, Putin has no reason to compromise, since this conflict represents an existential threat to Russia, regardless of how much the West refuses to understand or accept the logic of this Russian stance. The West can only react to this position, and thus it is essential that Russia’s objectives be uncompromisingly accepted—something the West is unwilling to do. Therefore, the question arises: what kind of agreement is possible at all? What are its foundations? According to the professor, there is no magic solution to this conflict.
• An opportunity for Vladimir Putin to present himself as a diplomatically rational actor, rather than the warmongering madman he has long been portrayed (demonized) as in the West. As we wrote last month: “as incredible as it may sound to today’s political elites and the wider public in the West, if one conducts a detailed analysis of the structure and composition of the Russian political elite in and around the Kremlin, one will see that Putin is potentially a voice of realpolitik pragmatism with whom one can sit down and negotiate, for example, spheres of influence and a new security architecture in Europe—as opposed to the many irrational voices within the Russian elite who for years have been calling for certain nuclear solutions” (Rukavina, 2025). The professor further adds that there will be opportunities to discuss peace, broader security arrangements in the world and in Europe, and ways to improve U.S.-Russian relations. The Russian president is coming onto U.S. soil and stepping out of isolation, therefore Putin has nothing to lose at this meeting, but only to demonstrate—as he has until now—his rationality and his commitment to Russia’s clear national interest, unchanged for decades.
• There will be no final peace agreement, but positions on areas of agreement will be reaffirmed, namely the general improvement of U.S.-Russian relations. On the other hand, true improvement of U.S.-Russian relations cannot occur until the interstate Russian-Ukrainian conflict is resolved. In the future, the professor notes, it will be interesting to see what happens if Russia continues advancing in Ukraine and, once (and if) Ukrainian defenses collapse, how the West will respond to Russia’s open path toward the Dnipro River. Will the West (Europe and the U.S.) simply accept this and say: the matter is settled, or will it double down on efforts to defend Ukraine by continuing the war with whatever means they can? The professor would bet on the latter scenario, predicting that most of the West will still support Ukraine, further worsening U.S.-Russian relations. We should not forget that Trump and figures like J.D. Vance are in the minority in the West in wanting to sit down and negotiate with Russia—yet those same people are still arming Ukraine. However, the major challenge for Ukraine is not so much armaments as the heavy losses in Ukrainian manpower.
• In strategic terms, comparing U.S. and Russian positions, according to the professor, is like comparing Bambi to Godzilla. The Russians have a clearly defined vision, mission, national interests, goals, and the resources to implement their foreign and security policy until they achieve everything on their agenda. The U.S., with Donald Trump, does not want the war in Ukraine and wants it to end as soon as possible. Russia knows what it wants; the U.S. knows what it does not want. As an American, the professor laments that for years U.S. institutions have been strategically degraded and meritocratically hollowed out. The current conflict is proof of that.
• The issue of territorial exchange cannot be discussed without Russia (and Ukraine).
• Donald Trump should have been more concerned with and better positioned himself strategically regarding veto players on peace in the U.S. and Europe, who want to continue the war and provide greater support for Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2025a; Mearsheimer, 2025b).

After the meeting, most of what the professor had predicted actually came true. The main outcome of the negotiations is very simple:
The mountains trembled, and the (Russian) bear returned (from three years of Western isolation, and on American soil at that). This scenario probably seemed unreal to many until it happened, which only demonstrates the levels of unpredictability and contingency in international relations. Also, the key point is that U.S. anti-Russian sanctions against secondary actors (India and China) were postponed.

This meeting can be seen as an act of signaling toward third actors, rather than a direct mechanism for resolving the conflict. In negotiations, crucial information is often conveyed not through explicit agreements, but through deliberate gestures, choice of language, and symbolic moves that shape the expectations of other states and the international public. In that sense, the encounter between the American and Russian presidents in Alaska (whose symbolism has already been discussed) can be interpreted as an example of a communicative signal directed toward Europe, China, and even the Global South – a message that both powers, despite conflicts and divergent interests, remain capable and willing to engage in direct dialogue. Thus, the summit takes on the function of a ritual act of diplomacy in which symbols and signals are just as important as concrete negotiating content, confirming the thesis that diplomacy is simultaneously communication, performance, and a way of structuring the international order.

Speaking of symbols, a brief reflection on the T-shirt with the symbolic inscription USSR (Russian: CCCP) worn by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Interpretations vary, but in context—given that the meeting took place in the United States, where the Monroe Doctrine prevails (limiting European influence in the Americas, or “America for Americans”)—Lavrov was merely reminding the audience of the Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, better known as the Kozyrev Doctrine of 1992/1993. It states that Russia’s “near abroad” (the former Soviet republics) is a Russian sphere of influence. Let us recall that the first foreign minister of the Russian Federation, Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev, was Yeltsin’s liberal pro-Western appointee who advocated closer cooperation between Russia, the U.S., and NATO (Rukavina, 2024: 64). Kozyrev was likely inspired by American geopolitical ideas such as the Monroe Doctrine and the famous Manifest Destiny (the ideological justification for U.S. expansion)—a reminder that Sergei Lavrov may have intended.

China, as a “silent observer” of the meeting, closely watched developments and welcomed the progress toward peace. Although not present, every U.S.-Russian political calculation and move directly or indirectly concerns China (balance of power, energy, trade, logistics and technology chains, security dilemmas, and more). It will be interesting to see, once the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ends, whether Russia will play the game Ukraine was supposed to play through a foreign policy of balancing—except that Russia would balance between the U.S. and China, while Ukraine pursued such a strategy from the collapse of the USSR until 2014 and the Euromaidan, balancing between the West and Russia. By adopting this foreign policy strategy of balancing between the U.S. and China, Russia gains an opportunity to emerge from Western isolation, rise above sanctions, and successfully rebuild once the military operations conclude. On the other hand, if no agreement is reached among the Western allies (the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine), Trump could potentially cut through all efforts and present the Europeans and Ukrainians with his peace deal as an ultimatum: either accept this agreement, or I withdraw from all forms of support for this conflict, and you continue fighting to the bitter end (probably also with American weapons, which Europeans would purchase for Ukraine—thus destroying themselves, Ukraine, and Russia, while filling the coffers of the U.S. budget and the private accounts of the military-industrial complex). This was evident in President Trump’s speech after the meeting when he stated that it is up to the Europeans and Ukrainians whether they will accept the peace agreement or not, which shows that even Trump himself recognizes the enormous difficulties in reaching an accord.

Of course, the far more likely scenario is that in the coming period, diplomatic efforts and proposals will intensify, but one must always be wary of various global “spiders” and their destructive webs, which can undermine diplomatic efforts with provocations and manipulations. Although we may still be far from a final peace agreement, the direction is set toward it, which is in itself progress. In the coming period, talks will focus on ending the conflict, and for Russia, besides territory, equally important points will be the neutralization and demilitarization of Ukraine, as well as cultural and linguistic rights for Russians in Ukraine. Also crucial will be the issue of security guarantees—not only for Ukraine, as many think and as the media constantly report, but also for Russia, which will demand security guarantees for itself to ensure that once peace agreements are signed, they are not later undermined (as was the case with the Minsk Agreements), and that no party dares to launch new attacks on (potentially new, but also old) Russian territories. Here, it will be interesting to see who provides such security guarantees—only the European allies and the U.S., or whether new actors like China and India will emerge as guarantors of security, as suggested by some diplomatic sources.

Trump and Putin’s full news conference following Alaska summit

Pursuing Peace

The very title of the summit, Pursuing Peace (not ceasefire), shows an understanding of the Russian position, which speaks of peace, not of ceasefires, since Russia finds it extremely difficult to trust the West and Ukraine after the two failed Minsk ceasefires. Let us recall former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande, who stated after the start of Russia’s offensive military actions in Ukraine in 2022 that the Minsk Agreements were merely a way to buy time for Ukraine to arm itself and prepare for conflict with Russia (Prouvost, 2022) (Schwarz, 2022). Such a statement is diplomatically and geopolitically extremely dangerous, since it leads to the conclusion that the agreement was a fraud from the very beginning and an empty piece of paper, and for Russia just another in a series of betrayals and disappointments by the West (Reuters, 2022). In other words, the Minsk Agreement was never even meant to be implemented. After such admissions by the two strongest European states, Germany and France, which publicly advocate for the promotion and adherence to international law and signed treaties based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, why would anyone trust them again (Rukavina, 2024: 23)?

Trump, like Putin, goes straight for peace; he does not want new ceasefires (something Trump repeated yesterday to Zelensky, whom he is meeting on Monday), because from the Russian perspective a ceasefire would only be used for Ukraine to rearm and prepare again for military action. Therefore, both Trump’s and Putin’s position is: let’s end the conflicts, establish peace, and move toward economic, trade, and financial cooperation as well as a new European security architecture (which, paradoxically, many European leaders do not want). Russia is a vast market but also a source of numerous minerals and raw materials needed by the U.S. if it wants to remain a key global power. There is also Russia’s influence in the Middle East, the Arctic, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Africa, and the crucial issue that remains largely unspoken: China (as well as various other possible topics potentially discussed behind closed doors). But the key to unlocking these many opportunities awaiting realization, investment, and Russia’s reintegration into the world is Ukraine.

The conflict, which Donald Trump inherited from Biden (and which, as Putin reiterated, would never have begun had Trump been president), is extremely complex to resolve diplomatically and therefore continues on the battlefield. The central question remains: how can one win a conventional war against a nuclear power in a conflict that the nuclear power perceives as an existential threat (regardless of Western arguments that it is not a threat—because it is up to each actor to define what constitutes a threat, not for someone else to define it on their behalf)?

Stories and narratives about Donald Trump’s supposed wish to win the Nobel Peace Prize are irrelevant—even if true—because if he indeed becomes the key figure who ends the conflict in Europe, he certainly should be awarded it. The prize itself has for years been the subject of debates and controversies, as it has been awarded to individuals or institutions whose decisions and actions were questionable or contradictory to the idea of peace, such as Henry Kissinger, Yasser Arafat, Barack Obama, the European Union, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and others. Donald Trump would not stand out too much on this list, given the controversies already tied to him, especially when compared with many other figures who have received this award. In fact, it would be fascinating in a world of contingency to see Trump actually receive the Nobel Peace Prize and then refuse to accept it because of the other controversial figures who hold it, not wanting to be grouped with them.

The more problematic question from the standpoint of the liberal post-Cold War paradigm is: how will Donald Trump achieve peace in Europe (and potentially the Nobel Peace Prize)? By acknowledging violations and breaches of international law and legitimizing outright aggression against a member state of the international order? By bringing the use of force back onto the world stage? By changing borders in Europe, where many states harbor territorial claims against their neighbors, thereby opening the door to potential new future challenges? Just as in the past 30 years (and partly even today) it was difficult to be a realist (a conservative) in international relations, it is now increasingly difficult to be a liberal and watch as the very foundations of liberal theoretical-ideological thinking, once deeply rooted in the West (especially in the European Union), begin to erode.

Key moments from Trump-Putin meeting

What Can Ukraine Do Now?

The story of Ukraine is truly tragic. Looking at the long term, over the past 111 years, much has broken over Ukraine: the First World War (1914–1918), the Russian Civil War (1918–1922), purges and famines (which affected Ukraine but also other parts of the USSR such as Russia and Kazakhstan—something often overlooked), the Second World War (1941–1945) with major battles fought in Ukraine, conflicts in Western Ukraine after the Second World War (Rukavina, 2022: 103), the Chernobyl disaster (1986), chaos and crime in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR, the Orange Revolution (2004), the Euromaidan Revolution (2013–2014), the intra-Ukrainian conflict (2014–2022), and the current interstate Russian-Ukrainian war (2022–present).

It would be interesting to examine whether these historical tragedies of Ukraine correlate with the British geopolitical thought of Halford Mackinder: Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland (Russia and its close neighborhood); who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia); who rules the World-Island commands the world.

Of course, it is understandable that Ukrainians today do not want to give up around 20% of their territory, but continuing the conflict could cost them much more—both in territory and in human lives. They can always count on contingency and the unpredictability of international relations and the potential collapse of the regime in Russia, though that is unlikely. Therefore, continuing a war against a nuclear power is catastrophic for Ukraine, as well as tragic (and also dangerous for the world due to the risk of nuclear escalation).

A potential rational and pragmatic way out of this conflict for Ukraine is to make peace and establish a modus vivendi with Russia, because Russia will always be its neighbor and cannot be escaped. Naturally, this is highly unlikely, not only because Ukraine’s political elite do not want it, but also because the West would oppose it, having spent vast resources over the past three years to weaken Russia (if not to destroy it, with Ukraine as the means) and to present (construct/demonize) it propagandistically as an extremely negative actor, with whom any form of modus vivendi seems almost impossible—though perhaps such a modus vivendi with Russia is closer to reality than ever after the U.S.-Russian meeting in Alaska.

Healing the poisoned relations between the West and Russia begins with peace in Ukraine, through finding a peaceful coexistence and modus vivendi for Ukraine with both the West and Russia (Mearsheimer, 2025b), and a return to Ukraine’s once-successful foreign policy strategy—balancing between the West and Russia (which, of course, is something of a horror story for individuals rooted in the liberal post-Cold War paradigm).

European leaders react to Trump-Putin summit

The Alternative to Diplomacy and Peace Is Conflict and War

In conclusion, I repeat my personal (academic-humanistic) stance from the spring of 2022, which now seems to be slowly becoming reality (although much work and political will are still needed to achieve it):

The ontological being of man resides far more easily in a world where diplomats lose their tempers than in one where people lose their lives. A hundred years of diplomatic quarrels is better than one minute of war. Therefore, the senselessness of this conflict must be brought to an immediate end with peace (or a ceasefire), even if many malicious and tendentious individuals may, at this moment, consider such a solution “meaningless.”

For (so far unsuccessful) reasonable and rational diplomacy to halt acts of war, it is necessary to encourage, activate, and bring diplomats to their senses—reminding them that the struggle is not against some evil or phantom forces, but against people just like ourselves, with their own interests and desires. Precisely because we are the same, it is essential to sit at the table and talk—at least try to understand the other side, even if, for now, it seems unimaginable and impossible to forgive all the atrocities that have irreversibly been committed.

The futility of war lies in the argument that war does not show who is right, but who will remain alive. And if we do not end this war, there is the fear of a (nuclear) possibility that it will end humanity as we know it. “Let us therefore pursue what makes for peace and for mutual upbuilding” (Romans 14:19).

Spec. pol. Bruno Rukavina is a specialist in foreign policy and diplomacy and a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.

Literature:

Mearsheimer, John (2025a) Will Putin Outfox Trump? Judge Napolitano – Judging Freedom. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eGPgHqd-g8

Mearsheimer, John (2025b) BREAKS DOWN Trump Putin Summit. Breaking Points. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q31nwnbNMmo

Rukavina, Bruno (2022) The Crimean Peninsula – A Geopolitical and Geostrategic Overview of the Past, Present and Future. Forum for Security Studies, 6(6), 89–118. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/303586

Rukavina, Bruno (2023) The Futility of the War Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Mi Portal. Available at: https://miportal.hr/2023/01/03/besmisao-rata-izmedu-ruske-federacije-i-ukrajine/

Rukavina, Bruno (2024) The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (2014–2022). Specialist Thesis, Faculty of Political Science – University of Zagreb. Available at: https://repozitorij.fpzg.unizg.hr/islandora/object/fpzg%3A2538

Rukavina, Bruno (2025) Why a Ukrainian Storm is Impossible. Geopolitika News. Available at: https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/zasto-je-nemoguca-ukrajinska-oluja