By Bruno Rukavina
The author analyzes current insights and conclusions regarding the causes and triggers of the interstate Russia-Ukraine conflict. He then focuses on the different perspectives and interpretations of this conflict. The third part of the analysis examines the third victim of the interstate Russia-Ukraine conflict, the European Union, and its kind of political-economic harakiri (in the name of post–Cold War liberalism).
Repetitio est mater studiorum
When history is taught in schools about any conflict, alongside contextualizing the warring sides and their roles, the causes and triggers of the conflict are always identified. Very few conflicts or wars in history arise purely from the whims of rulers or political elites. Conflicts almost always emerge within a context of causal relationships. What are the causes, and what was the trigger for the current interstate Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Numerous authors and sources most commonly mention the following causes of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: “the eastward expansion of NATO, which represents an existential threat to Russia” (Mearsheimer, 2022: 15–25); “non-compliance (or selective compliance) with international (and constitutional) law, the (fragmented) regime of the Russian Federation fearing democratization (of the political system) and liberalization (of society)” (Rukavina, 2023) in its near neighborhood; “Russia’s ambitions for control and influence over Ukraine (which had been declining for years), Ukraine’s increasing orientation toward the West, Putin’s conviction that Ukrainians would not fight and that the operation would be quick” (Götz & Ekman, 2024: 198); and the constant militarization of Ukraine since 2014. “The Western response to the events of 2014 was to double down on the existing strategy and make Ukraine a de facto NATO member. The alliance began training the Ukrainian military as early as 2014, with an average of 10,000 troops trained annually over the next eight years” (Mearsheimer, 2022: 15–25). Therefore, this involves the long-term, constant militarization of Ukraine and its preparation for military conflict with the DNR and LNR (and Russia).
There are also several additional (or secondary) causes that can more precisely be viewed as influential factors leading to the conflict, appearing in some analysts’ and researchers’ narratives: energy factors and reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas (breaking a supply line that has industrial Europe—Germany—on one end, and cheap energy from the East—Russia—on the other), internal problems and economic pressures in Russia and among Russian allies (for example in Belarus) in 2021, potentially aiming at a new “color revolution,” the effect of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, signals from the West that Ukraine would not be militarily defended and that NATO would remain (quasi) passive, and the acceleration of multipolarity in the world.
Many researchers, analysts, and experts emphasize that it is still “largely unknown why Russia decided on the Special Military Operation/invasion due to a lack of strong evidence and the closed decision-making processes in the Kremlin” (Polianskii, 2024: 168).
As usual in international events, historians of the future and their research of Russian (as well as Ukrainian and Western) archives 50 or 100 years from now will likely provide more precise explanations of the additional causes of the outbreak of this conflict (with history, as always, written by the victors, who are also the “right” side of history). However, the immediate trigger of the conflict is always a single act that sparks the event at that particular moment in history. For the interstate Russia-Ukraine conflict, the trigger was Russia’s interpretation of the start of the Ukrainian military offensive on the DNR and LNR in February 2022, to which Russia responded with a military offensive (an invasion or aggression according to the collective security paradigm) across Ukraine.
The intensity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine has been determined through a quantitative analysis of 383 Daily Reports by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, mathematically calculating the number of ceasefire violations under the Minsk Agreement. Russian foreign and security policy clearly correlates with this intensity: as the intensity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine increased, Russian foreign and security policy became more active.
The first wave of increased conflict in eastern Ukraine occurred in April 2021, accompanied by Russian military exercises and troop buildups along the Ukrainian border, while the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned of the deteriorating situation and the need to implement the Minsk Agreement. A similar situation occurred in November 2021, with military exercises, troop buildups, and regular foreign policy activity, when Russia requested security guarantees from the West, primarily from the U.S. and NATO.
After unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations in January 2022, a third wave of increased intensity occurred on 15 February 2022, resulting in the start of the Special Military Operation—or, in the Western narrative, the invasion (or aggression under the collective security paradigm)—of Ukraine. This link can be viewed as a causal relationship: the increase in conflict intensity (independent variable) in eastern Ukraine caused the dependent variable—Russian foreign and security activity (Corbetta, 2022: 74).
“By early 2022, militarization and tensions on the western borders of the Russian Federation, caused by the United States and its satellites, had reached an unacceptable level. The refusal of the collective West to seriously consider Russian proposals for mutual security guarantees ultimately confirmed their unwillingness to find a compromise on controversial issues. Meanwhile, the accelerated preparation of the Kyiv regime for a large-scale military offensive against the population of Donbas created a direct threat to Russia’s national security. Russia could not fail to respond” (Obzor MID Rossii, 2023: 3).
Different Perspectives and Understandings of the Conflict
Since the start of the conflict, various analogies and interpretations have emerged. Who poses an existential threat to whom? Is Russia a threat to Ukraine if Ukraine has been seeking military-political neutrality like Finland? Or is a NATO-aligned Ukraine an existential threat to Russia (and if not, why then was Cuba with Soviet missiles an existential threat to the U.S. in 1962)? What about humanitarian interventions based on liberal military interventionism or “humanitarian bombing”? Under what principle or law could the U.S. and NATO intervene in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 to protect the Albanian minority from Serbian forces, while Russia cannot intervene in Ukraine to protect the Russian minority from Ukrainian forces? How much is Ukraine fighting for its freedom as a small nation, and how much for the (hidden) interests of foreign centers of power? How much did Russia fear Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic membership, which would have made Ukraine a functional liberal democracy successfully managing its rich resources?
Is Ukraine, according to liberal theory, a subject of international relations, freely deciding its fate and alliances, or, according to realism, part of an international structure/system of (im)balance of power among great powers?
To what extent is the entire Ukraine conflict a trap for Russia? Could Russia simply watch Ukraine’s offensive that began on 15 February 2022 (for the third time in ten months; the first two attempts were in April and November 2021) and risk the fall of the DNR and LNR, or intervene in all of Ukraine to prevent this scenario? Russia thus faces the post-Cold War aporia: “Either it will be characterized as a rule-breaking state by the West (and sanctioned for defending its national interests from NATO expansion) or it will submit to U.S. interests, as it did with liberalization in the 1990s” (Rukavina, 2024: 62).
Furthermore, why is neutrality so demonized, and what would have been so catastrophic had the Minsk Agreement been implemented, allowing Ukraine to conduct a balanced foreign policy between major powers (which it largely practiced from 1991 to 2014 and the Euromaidan uprising), similar to the Dubrovnik Republic or the SFRY?
This also raises an interesting question of imperialism: “To what extent is Ukraine fighting against Russian imperialism, and to what extent is this a proxy conflict of Western (American-British) perfidious democratic imperialism (with European dominion) against Russian, potentially more transparent (in terms of who actually rules) imperialism?” (Rukavina, 2024: 65). Who are the winners and losers of this conflict? The most obvious losers are those who lose their lives in another European inter-Christian conflict, their families and loved ones, and internationally, certainly Ukraine, Russia, and EU member states.
The Third Victim and Harakiri in the Name of Post–Cold War Liberalism
When discussing the European Union, it is necessary to emphasize its conceptual framework, often overlooked when studying it as an “actor” in international relations. It is a sui generis institution, a hybrid of federation and confederation, but the key actors are still nation-states and their leaders. Nation-states remain the pinnacle of organized human communities, while the EU attempts to be the next evolutionary step above nation-states, similar to earlier experiments such as the SFRY and USSR. Since the French Revolution and the fall of the Ancien Régime, nation-states have remained the foundation of international organization.
Regarding the EU’s policy toward the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022, one can conclude that it has been largely self-destructive, sometimes unconsciously by political-economic elites. Deeply immersed in the liberal zeitgeist and the collective security paradigm, most EU officials and the bureaucratic apparatus refuse to assess the situation realistically and pragmatically attempt to contribute to peace in Europe. Perhaps they forget that the EU won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, and today, through militarization, it is transforming into a militant international organization that sometimes paranoically seeks (or potentially constructs) threats and challenges. Why has it been so difficult in the last four years to hold even one EU-Russia meeting or send a few EU diplomatic emissaries to Moscow with the goal of peacekeeping or ceasefire mediation? Perhaps the American president Joe Biden was the obstacle—but he is no longer president. Will the EU possibly gift its Nobel Peace Prize to Donald Trump, as Maria Corina Machado did, if he successfully brokers peace between Russia and Ukraine?
Through its current actions toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU is significantly exhausting itself financially and economically, committing a kind of harakiri (perhaps in the name of post–Cold War liberalism or its more radical versions, like “woke culture”). Combined with mass militarization, generous military-financial support for Ukraine, higher energy costs from various sources worldwide (many of them still Russian but purchased through intermediaries), it is clear that the EU faces numerous challenges ahead. Politically, on a global level, the EU is almost completely auto-marginalized.
Unless the EU returns to its conservative realist origins and the vision of its founding fathers, other international organizations and platforms (BRICS) could marginalize it in the coming decades. This is also evident in the EU’s relations with the U.S. After the U.S. (and the U.K.) distanced the EU from Russia (its natural continental ally, as people are naturally land-oriented, telurocratic beings rather than maritime), it now attempts to distance the EU from Iran, China, India, or any partner with whom the EU could become a competitor.
If the EU wants to emancipate itself from constraints preventing it from becoming a realpolitik actor, it must emancipate from ideological post–Cold War liberalism and return to realism (conservatism in international relations), focusing on the real situation, security over (illusory or irresponsible) liberty, and rejecting the idealism/utopianism of alienated European liberal elites. Long-term, freedom need not be abandoned, but short-term, European citizens require security, while, as John Maynard Keynes said, “in the long run, we are all dead.”
