By Bruno Rukavina

Despite the common perception of Russia as a continental power with dominant interests in Europe and the post-Soviet space, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region in global economic, security, and political relations over the past 10–15 years has forced Moscow to redefine its foreign policy and defense engagement toward the eastern horizons. The Pacific, which makes up more than one-third of the world’s ocean surface, has become a key axis of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geostrategy in the 21st century – not only for the United States and China, but also for the Russian Federation.

Eight Federal Districts

At the outset, it is important to note that the Russian Federation is administratively divided into eight federal districts (федеральные округа), which serve as a supra-regional level of coordination and administration (but are not constitutional entities like republics, krais, or oblasts):

• Central (Центральный) – headquartered in Moscow
• Northwestern (Северо-Западный) – headquartered in St. Petersburg
• Southern (Южный) – headquartered in Rostov-on-Don
• North Caucasian (Северо-Кавказский) – headquartered in Pyatigorsk
• Volga (Приволжский) – headquartered in Nizhny Novgorod
• Ural (Уральский) – headquartered in Yekaterinburg
• Siberian (Сибирский) – headquartered in Novosibirsk
• Far Eastern (Дальневосточный) – headquartered in Vladivostok (formerly in Khabarovsk)

(A short-lived Crimean Federal District also existed between 2014 and 2016, but it was dissolved in 2016 and merged with the Southern District.)

This analysis focuses on the Far Eastern Federal District, which includes 11 regions:

• Amur Oblast (Амурская область)
• Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Еврейская автономная область)
• Kamchatka Krai (Камчатский край)
• Magadan Oblast (Магаданская область)
• Primorsky Krai (Приморский край)
• Sakha (Yakutia) Republic (Республика Саха (Якутия))
• Sakhalin Oblast (Сахалинская область)
• Khabarovsk Krai (Хабаровский край)
• Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (Чукотский автономный округ)
• Zabaykalsky Krai (Забайкальский край) – joined in 2018
• Republic of Buryatia (Республика Бурятия) – joined in 2018

(Until 2018, the Far Eastern District included nine regions, but Buryatia and Zabaykalsky Krai were transferred from the Siberian to the Far Eastern District as part of the government’s strategy for the development of Russia’s east.)

Geography and Demographics of the Far Eastern District

The Far Eastern District covers nearly 40% of Russia’s territory (about 6,952,600 km²), yet it is home to less than 5% of the population – 7.867 million people (and between 2010 and 2021, the population fell by about 500,000). Comparing the 2010 and 2021 Russian census data, population growth occurred only in Yakutia and Buryatia – by 3.9% and 0.9%, respectively – while all other regions experienced decline. The sharpest drop was recorded in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast: 14.8%.

“The largest city in the Far Eastern District is now Khabarovsk, not Vladivostok: 617,400 versus 603,500 inhabitants. Yakutsk has overtaken Chita, despite the fact that in 1989 it was half its size” (Ivolgin, 2021). In general, Russia has faced demographic challenges for decades, similar to much of Europe, with ongoing debates about migration policy and the need to promote family-oriented (conservative) values. However, liberal and atomized individualistic values still dominate, posing obstacles to Russia’s envisioned civilizational conservative direction – a separate subject of research.

Strategic Dilemmas and Challenges of Russia’s Pacific Orientation

This spatial asymmetry generates specific geopolitical dilemmas: on the one hand, the Far Eastern District has the potential for maritime power projection, supported by the depth of Siberian territory and abundant energy resources; on the other hand, the lack of human capital and infrastructural underdevelopment limit the operational capacity of this potential. For years, Russian political scientists have warned of a “strategic vacuum” making the Far East vulnerable, especially in light of China’s economic expansion.

One key reason for the Far East’s relative isolation lies in Russia’s long-standing political and economic orientation toward the West (Euro-Atlantic states and Europe). However, following the outbreak of the interstate Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 and the imposition of sanctions, Russia’s European isolation has revived “louder” questioning of Russia’s orientation and identity as a Eurasian state and/or civilization. If Russia’s Atlantic and European orientation has resulted in high levels of mistrust (Rukavina, 2025), its turn toward Asia in the Far East offers Moscow a way to bypass Europe’s wall of isolation and sanctions.

Already in 2014, with the imposition of the first major Western sanctions, Russia proclaimed its so-called “Pivot to the East” (Поворот на Восток) as a strategic shift in foreign and energy policy. Projects such as the Sakhalin I and II LNG terminals, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, and future Arctic ports are geared toward exporting energy resources to Asia and potentially to America via the Pacific. The U.S. – particularly the Trump administration – showed great interest in these resources and infrastructural projects; according to anonymous diplomatic sources, this was even one of the topics discussed by Trump and Putin in Alaska.

“It will be interesting to see, once the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ends, whether Russia will adopt the foreign policy of balancing that Ukraine was supposed to play – except that Russia would balance between the U.S. and China, while Ukraine from the collapse of the USSR until Euromaidan in 2014 balanced between the West and Russia. With such a foreign policy strategy of balancing between Washington and Beijing, Russia could find a way back from Western isolation, rise above sanctions, and successfully rebuild itself once the military conflict ends” (Rukavina, 2025a).

Thus, Russia seeks to diversify economic partners and strengthen the sovereignty of its energy policy, especially after the West’s “mother of all sanctions policies” since 2022 due to the interstate war with Ukraine.

Advantages of Russia’s Access to the Pacific

Access to the Pacific provides Russia with direct entry to key maritime routes in the South China and East China Seas, as well as the Strait of Malacca – through which more than 60% of world trade passes. Vladivostok, which since 2015 has had free port status, is becoming a hub of Trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific transport routes (Primorye-1 and Primorye-2), linking Russia’s interior to Asian (and potentially future American) markets. Political science researchers emphasize that Russia’s Pacific access is not only a logistical necessity but also a symbolic message of Moscow’s global reach and the shaping of a multipolar world.

In geostrategic (military) terms, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation (Тихоокеанский флот), headquartered in Vladivostok but with additional bases in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Vilyuchinsk, Fokino, Magadan, and Sovetskaya Gavan, plays a crucial role in maintaining the nuclear triad. Particularly important are the Borei-class submarines armed with ballistic missiles, which form the backbone of Russia’s nuclear deterrence doctrine (“deterrence by retaliation”). Military exercises such as Vostok and joint naval drills with China demonstrate Moscow’s ambition to strengthen its strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific, especially as a counterbalance to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance and potentially AUKUS – particularly once Russia concludes its military operations in Ukraine.

In recent years, alongside China, North Korea has become an increasingly important partner for Russia. This partnership is based primarily on economic and security (military) cooperation: delivery of North Korean weapon systems and materiel to Russia (due to the war in Ukraine), provision of manpower (for example, during the liberation of Kursk – a crucial opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain direct experience of modern warfare, which has changed significantly since the Korean War of 1950–1953), mutual exchanges in cyber operations, logistics, and sanctions evasion. For Pyongyang, Russia also represents, alongside China, another potential supportive hand in the UN Security Council.

Spec. pol. Bruno Rukavina is a specialist in foreign policy and diplomacy and a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.