Three Decades of Croatia’s Independence and 1100 Years of the Croatian Kingdom (Part I)

By Bruno Rukavina

The goal of this analysis is to draw historical lessons on the occasion of the 1100th anniversary of the Croatian Kingdom, the 80th anniversary of victory in the Second World War, and the 30th anniversary of the magnificent victory in the Homeland War. It also aims to highlight the key challenges facing Croatian society and the state, as well as offer a look into the future—towards our Homeland in the year 2050 or 2100—by outlining a kind of vision of Croatia to which we should aspire. This analysis of Croatia should be viewed more as a public invitation to discussion and debate about our future than as a demand that the analysis be entirely socially accepted.

A Look into History

In order to speak about the future, it is important to briefly reflect on the past. However, like most other states located in geopolitically significant areas—such as Croatia—we have perhaps too much history to cover even in several volumes of books, let alone in this analysis. Therefore, it is optimal to extract only some of the many lessons we can learn from Croatian history.

Personally, when I look back at my life so far, I find little benefit in constantly reliving the many positive and negative experiences that each of us has encountered at some point. No one is without their falls, but it is important to learn from mistakes. In the same way, we as Croats can draw many lessons from the historical actions of our ancestors, whose political and social development culminates in us—the present-day Republic of Croatia, the current form of the Croatian political community.

Historical Lessons

What are the main lessons we can draw from the history of Croatia?

1) The dangers faced by Croatian political leadership, since many Croatian rulers (or leaders in contemporary terminology) were betrayed and/or killed (King Demetrius Zvonimir, Petar Snačić, Fran Krsto Frankopan, Petar Zrinski, Stjepan Radić, Andrija Hebrang, Bruno Bušić, and others). Many others, on the other hand, survived by subordinating themselves to foreign centers of power, such as Ban Josip Jelačić. Leadership—primarily the establishment of a future vision of the Croatian community and the achievement of missions (managing and delegating tasks)—has been extremely problematic and challenging throughout Croatian history, because Croatia often lost the ability to act in accordance with its national interests (which were often undefined, much like today).

2) Sovereignty and the ability of Croatia to act freely as a community of free citizens must be protected. All alliances and integrations make sense for Croatia only if it enters them as an equal partner, with clear conditions and the possibility of exit, as well as clearly defined national interests that Croatia actively pursues within various international organizations, alliances, and unions—regardless of what they are now or will be in the future. In historical unions with the Hungarians and the Habsburgs, Croatia preserved its political and institutional distinctiveness—that is, Croatian state rights. Croatia continually maintained a Parliament (Sabor) and a Ban, showing the durability of its institutional awareness of autonomy and (limited) independence. Sovereignty must be carefully guarded, and entering alliances must be the result of clear criteria, reciprocity, and protocol, just as a potential future exit must be considered should a moment of critical contingency arise. The state requires strong, meritocratic, functional institutions because they outlive individuals and crises.

3) Croatia has played an important role as a defensive and stabilizing factor in Europe, but this requires meritocratic, nationally aware leadership and developed strategic thinking. Croatia served as Europe’s defensive shield several times:

  1. The Bulwark of Christianity (Antemurale Christianitatis)—the idea that symbolically anchors Croatia’s European mission in defending Western Christian civilization during wars against the Ottoman Empire (a lesser-known fact is that the Ottoman siege of Vienna did not pass through Croatian territories, but through Hungarian ones after the fall of Buda, which remained under Ottoman rule from 1541 to 1686);
  2. The Bulwark of (post–Cold War liberal) democracy during the wars of the 1990s against authoritarian socialist/communist Yugoslavia (Antemurale Demokratis);
  3. The Bulwark of Europe in the fight against illegal migration, attempting to curb illegal migratory flows despite both centrifugal challenges in Europe’s geopolitical environment and centripetal ones within Europe itself (Germany, which paradoxically encouraged unregulated migration in 2015 due to its own economic-financial interests) (Antemurale Europenitatis).

Thus, symbolically, Croatia bears a shield on its coat of arms—the šahovnica—as one who defends itself and others. At the same time, the šahovnica symbolizes the need for strategic and tactical leadership, like in a game of chess at the international level. Croatia will always lie on the border of great powers—it must prepare strategically, defend itself, balance when necessary, and know how to use its position for its own interests and a better quality of life for its people. It is essential to study, for example, the history of the Dubrovnik Republic and its foreign policy balancing among great powers.

4) The Croatian national movement developed through language, culture, and politics, and culminated at the beginning of the 20th century when, according to Hroch’s model of nation formation, Croatian political national consciousness was completed. Like every nation, Croatia fought incrementally throughout the 20th century for its statehood—the ultimate goal of every nation. Democracy survives only through active citizen participation and the preservation of political literacy. This is why promoting lifelong education and strengthening Croatian civic engagement and civil society activities is essential—regardless of ideological orientation. Democracy and sovereignty require constant civic and national engagement and political literacy, rather than national reactivity when it is already too late. Nations overthrew monarchies and created the democracies we live in, while monarchies were elitist international projects ruled by closed (often non-meritocratic) aristocratic networks linked by arranged marriages (sometimes bordering on incest). Therefore, preserving a sovereign Croatia as a democracy requires a conscious national belonging to the Croatian community—whether civic or ethnic (which should not be exclusionary, but integrative). If we do not renew and nurture national identity (language, culture, education), we risk weakening and losing it.

5) The previous point brings us to another interesting category—openness and the integrative nature of Croats. This does not imply the disappearance of Croatian national identity, but rather that Croatian citizens can always be created or Croatianized (if they freely wish to become such) because nationalism as an Enlightenment ideology is based on the fundamental idea behind national movements: Cogito ergo sum—I think, therefore I am. If we accept the theory that Croats arrived in the 7th century, our ancestors did not simply come and close themselves off. They mixed with the indigenous peoples of these areas—certain Illyrian tribes—as well as with others who passed through and settled here, leaving descendants.

However, demography remains one of the fundamental issues for Croatia’s (and Europe’s) future, and everything necessary must be ensured for demographic renewal of Croats, with immigration always being a secondary measure of demographic policy—not the main one. A cultural element of Christianity (especially the inclusive and universal Roman Catholicism) also plays a role—open to others through dialogue, yet caring for its own community through Christian morality and ethics. We must be tolerant and integrative, yet aware of our foundations. Thus, demography and identity are key to survival. Alongside demography, an essential element is the economic-financial system of the Republic of Croatia, which—interestingly—every Croatian government since the 1990s has preserved. There is little detailed discussion about the role of the central bank, currency, development policy, entrepreneurship support, taxes, and similar topics.

6) Unity—not division—is the foundation of a successful and developed Croatian community. This does not mean that we must agree on everything or hold identical viewpoints, but we should not create antagonisms. Instead, we must uphold a democratic minimum—agreeing to disagree on some issues, while striving toward the same goal and vision of Croatia, as was the case during the creation of the Croatian state in the 1990s under President Franjo Tuđman, who pragmatically balanced different factions to establish the Republic of Croatia. The greatest threat to Croats often comes from within—discord, envy, (Croatian) spite, and short-sightedness. Only unity around clearly defined national interests ensures the survival of the national community.

7) Avoid both extreme left and extreme right political options and strengthen moderate centrist civic movements—whether left or right—that are democratically oriented toward solving essential problems and challenges of Croatian citizens. It is important to emphasize the political science distinction between radicalism and extremism.

Radicalism refers to political positions or actions seeking deep or fundamental societal changes, but without necessarily rejecting democratic values. Radical ideas may be legal and rely on democratic methods, even if intense or unconventional.

Extremism is a harsher form of political action. Extremists reject the fundamental values of a democratic constitutional state, including human equality and pluralism, and often gravitate toward monistic, authoritarian, or totalitarian models of governance. Extremism is incompatible with democracy, whereas radicalism may operate within it (Velički, 2010). This is why the politically correct term “extreme left and extreme right” is used here.

The So-Called Fascistization and Yugoslavization

The burden of the past in today’s discussions in Croatia is visible through narratives about the so-called fascistization or Yugoslavization of Croatia. In political science terms, neither phenomenon is truly occurring—except perhaps in a partial semantic or symbolic sense among individuals or narrow groups, which is marginal but can always be constructed as a perceived threat.

To speak of fascistization or Yugoslavization, political and ideological elements of fascism and Yugoslavism would need to exist in Croatian society. Therefore, we must first define what constitutes elements of fascism and Yugoslavism, and whether they are present in Croatian political parties and options.

Click here for part 2.

 

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