By Bruno Rukavina

The burden of the past in today’s discussions in Croatia is visible through speeches and narratives about the so-called fascization of Croatia or Yugoslavization of Croatia, while in political science terms neither is actually occurring, except perhaps partially in the semantic and symbolic sense among certain individuals or narrow groups within society. This is marginal, but can always be constructed as a threat. In order to speak about the fascization and/or Yugoslavization of Croatia, it is necessary that there exist political and ideological elements of fascism and Yugoslavism within Croatian society. Therefore, let us first define which elements constitute fascism and which constitute Yugoslavism, and whether they are present in Croatian political parties and political options.

Elements of Fascism and Yugoslavism – Their Absence in Croatia

Extensive political science literature has dealt with both fascism and Yugoslavism, so their main elements are easy to distinguish and identify (Croatian Encyclopedia, 2025) (Ravlić, 2022) (Korunić, 1984) (Bilandžić, 1999) (Dubravica, 1997) (Gross, 1973).

Elements of Fascism:

• Authoritarian rule and a strong leader: In current Croatian politics, there is no political figure who could be described as a strong, charismatic leader embodying the will of the people. On the contrary, we face an exceptional crisis of leadership, guidance and governance. There is also no political option that supports authoritarian government or rejects democracy, multiparty competition or democratic freedoms.
• Prohibition and control of culture and the free market: Croatia does not control the private lives of citizens nor does it forbid cultural activity or economic-market competition (although it does regulate some elements by law, as all countries do).
• Glorification of the cult of violence and war: There is no cult of war or violence in Croatia, nor are these considered noble or as proof of national vitality. Croatia has always sought peace and peaceful solutions, which it has demonstrated many times, including during the Homeland War, during which Tuđman and Milošević met around 48 times (Tuđman, 2015), and during which Croats offered numerous diplomatic solutions to the rebel Serbs (such as the Z4 Plan), which the separatists and Serbia rejected. All commemorations of the Homeland War fall within the framework of democratic societies—just as France celebrates 14 July (Bastille Day) or 8 May (Victory Day), similarly Poland, the United Kingdom (with 11 November – Remembrance Day), Italy on 25 April – Liberation Day, and Russia on 9 May – Victory Day. Croatia likewise celebrates 5 August – Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day.
  It is important to emphasize that isolated incidents of violence or vandalism—present in every country—cannot be equated with the glorification of violence, which is not promoted in Croatian media or society, nor is it organized by political parties or NGOs. Vandalism and idiotic behaviour accompanied by violence are international challenges present everywhere and do not prove fascization. What can occur is the political exploitation of such incidents by certain actors, constructing them in the media as a fascist threat, which is misleading.
• Antidemocratism: There is no political party in Croatia that rejects parliamentarism, individual rights, or pluralism.
• Colonialism and imperialism: There is no political option in Croatia that entertains imperial or colonial ideas—not least because Croatia historically never possessed colonies, unlike many respected Western democracies known for their colonial past.
• Popular fascist movement: No organized or institutionalized popular fascist movement exists in Croatia seeking to gain power.

Elements of Yugoslavism:

• Panslavic unification of South Slavs: No relevant political party in Croatia advocates renewed South Slavic unification—likely because history has already demonstrated twice that such projects fail, and anything that fails twice will fail a third time.
• Creation of a common state as a guarantor of freedom and strength of South Slavic peoples: No relevant political party in Croatia seeks to form any such common state.
• Promotion of a common language and culture: Attempts to create a unified culture, literature, and historical consciousness (some NGOs, individuals or cultural initiatives exist), but no political party that competes for state power promotes the idea of a single common language and culture, knowing such topics would be catastrophic for electoral success.
• Socialist self-management: Almost all political options in Croatia accept the neoliberal economic model, with the exception of some left-wing groups that emphasize social welfare more strongly, though still within capitalist structures. Scientifically, it has been shown that the party with the strongest social policies in Croatia is the HDZ.
• The idea of “brotherhood and unity”: This idea disappeared already within the SFRY after the death of its main embodiment, Josip Broz Tito. Although some individuals who spent their childhood in Yugoslavia feel nostalgia for that period, biological inevitability ensures there are fewer such individuals every year. This nostalgia will gradually disappear entirely, much like how we no longer have Habsburg-nostalgics, Venetian-nostalgics or Roman-nostalgics (or perhaps only a few dozen people in obscure NGOs). The same fate awaits Yugonostalgics.
• “Yugoslavia is dead” – a slogan heard this summer which paradoxically may have “awakened” Yugoslavia, since few considered it alive politically. No political option or party demands reunification into Yugoslavia (except perhaps some extreme-left groups, whose own family members may not vote for them).
  Moreover, any attempt to re-establish Yugoslavia is prohibited by Article 135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia:
  “It is prohibited to initiate proceedings for the association of the Republic of Croatia with other states if such association would lead or could lead to the restoration of Yugoslav state unity or a Balkan state union in any form” (Constitution, 2025).

However, some individuals in Croatia did declare themselves Yugoslavs in the last census—942 people according to the 2021 census (an increase compared to 176 in 2001, or perhaps they simply felt freer in 2021 due to greater levels of safety and freedom of expression) (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2021) (Jurišić, 2024). There are also associations dealing with the topic and a form of Yugoslav promotion, such as “Our Yugoslavia”, and some media outlets that occasionally publish Yugonostalgic or partly biased content.

Challenges From the Past of the 20th Century

It is important here to mention a very interesting article by Professor Mirjana Kasapović about Yugoslavia as a state-building project, titled GOODBYE POST-YUGOSLAVISM! in which she writes the following:

“Yugoslavia was the most unsuccessful European state of the 20th century. There is no state in Europe which, in some seventy years of existence—from December 1918 to January 1992—was created twice and fell apart twice in the seas of blood of its own citizens, in world, interstate, and civil wars of its South Slavic tribes and its brotherly nations and nationalities. The first Yugoslavia lasted not even 22 years, and the second not even 47—together they endured less than the average life expectancy of European citizens. Every economic and political arrangement was tried in order to preserve that state: it was capitalist and socialist, monarchical and republican, unitary and federal, pluralist and monist, the king’s right-wing and the marshal’s left-wing dictatorship. It belonged to the West and the East, was unaligned and non-aligned. Nothing helped.” (Kasapović, 2023: 266) (Sprečić, 2023).

It is also important to emphasize that the third Yugoslavia (1992–2003) did not distinguish itself either, and the remnants of that Yugoslavia remain in an entropic state because of the unresolved Serbia–Kosovo question.

Despite all the negative aspects of the Yugoslav project, its creation in 1945 made it possible (along with the 45-year period of peace in the region—or a pause from conflict) for today’s Croatia, through ZAVNOH (the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia), and through the actions of Croats/Slovenes Josip Broz Tito and the Partisan movement, of which Franjo Tuđman was also a part, to emerge as a victor in that conflict. On this foundation, the present post-Yalta international order was formed (often referenced today by many BRICS countries, while in the West the discussion focuses far more on the post–Cold War international order, taking 1989 and the fall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe as the key moment, where liberal democracies emerged as the winners).

It must also be stated, in accordance with modern civilizational values, that all crimes committed after the Second World War must be condemned, but condemning those crimes does not take away the victory in that war from the victor. However, that 1945 victory has only secondary importance for today’s Croatia, whose creation is rooted primarily in the last war that brought it into being—the Homeland War (1991–1995).

It is also necessary to point out the danger that may arise for the Republic of Croatia from certain countries if Croatia distances itself from the victory in the Second World War. Namely, some global actors are conducting a manipulative, deceitful, perfidious, and underhanded policy of equating the Republic of Croatia with the NDH, despite the clear distinction emphasized in the Croatian Constitution:

“In establishing the foundations of state sovereignty during the Second World War, expressed in opposition to the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941) in the decisions of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (1943), and subsequently in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia (1947) and later in the constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963–1990), at the historical turning point of rejecting the communist system and the changes in the international order in Europe, the Croatian people, in the first democratic elections (in 1990), freely expressed their will and confirmed their thousand-year-old state identity.” (Constitution, 2025).

This attempted equating is carried out today not only to strip Croatia of its 1945 victory, but also its 1995 victory—which, unfortunately, a segment of political actors in Croatia does not understand.

Any attempt to impose collective guilt on Croats or to force the Republic of Croatia into an official apology for victims in the NDH is unacceptable, since today’s Croatia is founded on the struggle for freedom from occupiers and collaborators in the Second World War, and was liberated by its own anti-fascist forces (Rukavina, 2025). It is likewise founded on the struggle against separatist movements and occupation in the Homeland War, led by Franjo Tuđman, who himself fought in Croatian anti-fascist units. Tuđman received from the Russian president the decoration “Medal of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov” for his contribution to the anti-fascist struggle—Russia’s symbolic recognition of Croatia’s belonging to the anti-fascist movement (Bandić & Aralica, 2015) (Jutarnji.hr, 2007).

The world is divided into winners and losers, and this is the foundation of the legitimacy of power and the right side of history, which—with remarkable consistency—tends to lie on the victorious side of a given historical event. Winners write history and define the “right side of history,” and Croatia does so as a winner of both the Second World War and the Homeland War.

“The winners of any conflict or competition are entitled to the truth and its interpretation as one of the rewards, while the losers are left to seek revenge and revisions—risking losing again—or to undergo catharsis, accept the loss, and build, in line with that result (and the winners’ constructions), a new and better future together with the winners.” (Rukavina, 2025b).

The Purpose of Such Narratives and Protests in Croatia – The Struggle for Power

Research clearly shows that there is neither a fascization nor a Yugoslavization of Croatian society—both are unconstitutional categories. But then why do these narratives and media constructs appear from both the left and the right?

This is primarily a matter of domestic political struggles, intensified by the Croatian media system, which is intertwined with the political elite. These elites use narratives (and acts of vandalism/hooliganism) about either fascization or Yugoslavization to heighten antagonism toward the other side, with the aim of preserving the political-economic elite and the current system, which is in certain elements corrupt and mediocratic, and which urgently requires essential meritocratic reform and opening up—as once written by former Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Davor Ivo Stier in The New Croatian Paradigm.

A major problem in Croatia is political opportunism combined with the exaggerated ambitions of certain (often under-qualified) political individuals who are incapable of producing a quality political program or formulating public policies that would genuinely improve the lives of Croatian citizens. Consequently, they resort to symbolism, semantics, distant history, and the antagonization of the Croatian citizenry through the construction of a supposed “other” within the Croatian national political demos, in order to remain in power or gain power.

This type of political exhibitionism is highly problematic because it weakens democratic mainstream Croatian political options—whether social-democratic or Christian-democratic conservative—which can be dangerous for democracy, since the moderate center is what protects democracy. But caution is needed here as well: in certain contexts, a closed-off center can lead to alienation and the erosion of democratic principles through out-of-touch public policies that fail to reflect the will of the majority demos. An example is Germany, where there is hardly any visible difference between the public policies of the SPD and the CDU, which is why the AfD is growing—highlighting the key issue for the German demos: migration policy, which both the SPD and CDU support.

It is necessary to address the problems of one’s own citizens, and not blindly follow ideological positions—no matter how ethically or morally superior certain actors may think they are. Successful politicians must know how to protect their community from both internal and external threats, always acting in the name of citizens with whom they may disagree, but whom they are elected to serve. They must balance competing interests on various levels—making the work of a politician extremely complex, and in recent years even dangerous, given the increase in violence against politicians of various ideological positions (e.g., the assassination attempts on the Slovak prime minister, the U.S. president, etc.).

Perhaps the growing similarity between the SDP and HDZ in Croatia, united or clustered in a single center, diminishes their relevance (although political relevance in Croatia, as elsewhere, is grounded in field work with voters). And to create differentiation (or to construct it themselves), they revive various historical topics due to the lack of political-economic programmatic innovation that could genuinely improve the lives of Croatian citizens.

In short, the purpose of labeling actors with fascism or Yugoslavism is the struggle for political power in Croatia (often accompanied by the ad hoc behavior of football fan groups, who are frequently exploited as instruments of certain political actors’ power struggles). Unfortunately, due to media reporting, this harms the reputation and image of Croatia abroad—which benefits always-present international critics of Croatia. The Croatian political elite appears insufficiently concerned about this, guided instead by narrow, shallow, and cheap atomized individual interests of remaining in power or coming to power.

The struggle for power is often dirty and involves blows below the belt, but during these blows one must always ensure that Croatia as a state remains intact and functional. Precisely because of this, a new visionary or leader is necessary—just as Franjo Tuđman once was—with a new reconciliation, with the marginalization of both left-wing and right-wing extremes, and with a new vision of Croatia.

Concluding Reflections on the Lessons Learned from History

This year, Croatia marks 1100 years of the Croatian Kingdom, 80 years since victory in the Second World War, and 30 years since victory in the Homeland War. From all the lessons of its history, Croatia must finally free itself from the dark shadows of the 20th century which continue to divide it. Instead, it should focus on the future through the foundation of its modern existence: the magnificent victory in the Homeland War, whose victorious spirit must be preserved and fostered.

In Croatia, there exists a certain oversaturation with history — we speak about history a great deal, yet paradoxically, very little is truly known accurately. For example, how many people around you, the reader of this analysis, know who the following heroes of Croatian history were: Ivan Lenković, Petar Kružić, Rudolf Perešin, Ivan Karlović, Petar Berislavić, Eugen Kvaternik, Damir Tomljanović Gavran, Vuk Krsto Frankopan, Mile Dedaković Jastreb, Andrija Matijaš Pauk, and others?

The development of an inclusive Croatian national consciousness is based precisely on 1100 years of the continuity of Croatian statehood, that is, on the legal and institutional existence of the Croatian Kingdom, which did not cease to exist in 1102, nor in 1527, nor in 1878. Croatia has always had its own institutions representing the tripartite division of power (the Ban – executive authority, the Sabor – parliamentary authority, and territorial courts) all the way until 1918, when Croatian state institutions were abolished for the first time in history.

However, even the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could not survive long without acknowledging the Croatian national question, which is why in 1939 the Banovina of Croatia was established and Croatian institutions were restored. These institutions continued, through various historical transformations, all the way to the present.

It is essential to research history and strive to view historical facts and their context as realistically as possible, based on available evidence, documents and sources. Whatever the past may have been, it does not determine our actions in the present. With our free will, capacity and resources, we are able to create a better future for our Croatian descendants.

Contemporary Challenges of Croatia

Before presenting a vision for the future, it is important to outline several key challenges facing contemporary Croatia:

1. Demographic collapse, caused by the emigration of young and working-age people, population ageing, and low fertility rates.
2. Dependence on tourism and a poorly diversified economy with a small share of high technology, entrepreneurial industry and innovation, alongside heavy reliance on EU funds (which we also use inefficiently).
   “Inflationary problems arose due to the inactivity or misguided activity of the CNB, which is responsible for price stability, as well as the inaction of the Croatian Government. The future of Croatia’s economy is highly problematic and challenging if the country continues to be a tourism-dependent state reliant on EU funds.” (Vidaković, 2025)
3. Clientelism, corruption, nepotism and closed institutions, characterised by a paradoxically large public sector with high expenses, yet slow and insufficiently efficient institutions.
4. Brain drain of highly educated young people and numerous weaknesses in the education system, which is not harmonized with the labour market (although such harmonization itself poses structural challenges).
5. Politically imposed social polarisation around historical topics, used by the political elite to maintain power while ignoring essential structural problems of Croatian citizens.
   “Who is dividing us, for what interests, and where does this politics of division and invocation of any losing historical structures lead?” (Rukavina, 2025b)
6. Long-term unsustainability of social services, primarily the pension and healthcare systems, due to demographic pressures and ageing.
7. Public distrust in institutions, political apathy and civic passivity, and the absence of a long-term strategy resulting from a lack of genuine Croatian leadership.

What Long-Term Vision Could Croatia Adopt in the 21st Century?

Let us first begin with an etymological clarification of the concept of a vision.

Vision of Croatia

A vision (Latin: visio – sight; seeing) is an ideal we strive toward. It should be inspirational and motivational. It answers questions such as: What do we want to become or achieve? What are our hopes and dreams? What do we want to accomplish long-term? A vision must be broad, descriptive, future-oriented, and must clearly and concisely outline the desired direction of societal development.

I would personally propose the following vision for Croatia (meant more as an invitation for others to reflect on their own ideas for the vision of our homeland, and one which I will continue to question and refine):

Croatia is a state of entrepreneurship, knowledge, technological development and innovation, with positive demographic trends, focused on building leadership to preserve and safeguard national identity through realpolitik balancing in a world of international challenges.

The Republic of Croatia can make progress once it stops using history as an instrument of political struggle and begins building an inclusive and stable democratic society – founded on the Homeland War as the basis of modern Croatian statehood – and oriented toward the future by solving the challenges of the present.

Part 1 of the article you can find here.

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