By Bruno Rukavina
The greatest challenge for the Russian Federation in the Far East (and for the country as a whole) remains demographics. The centralization of Russia has contributed to the migration of the population from regional areas to Moscow and Saint Petersburg (or, eventually, to the southern regions along the Black Sea). As a result, numerous pro-natalist measures have been implemented, such as financial assistance for the birth of a second or third child, subsidized loans for families with children, enhanced prenatal and neonatal care, expansion of kindergartens and preschools, and the work of NGOs and children’s camps throughout Russia.
For instance, near Vladivostok, there is a large children’s center called the All-Russian Children’s Center Ocean (Всероссийский детский центр Океан), which is one of four major federal children’s centers in Russia, along with Artek (Артек), Orlyonok (Орлёнок), and Smena (Смена). Located in Primorsky Krai on the coast of the Sea of Japan near Vladivostok, it was established in 1983 as a federal holiday center for children from across the Soviet Union. Even today, children attend it for several months to participate in various workshops and educational programs from all over Russia (and the former post-Soviet space) (Океан, 2025).
Demographic Challenges Hinder Russia’s Far Eastern Potential
The effectiveness of demographic measures is limited in Russia, as it is in the West, because improvements in living conditions and liberal development often steer people toward individualism and liberal values, delaying the start of families. In today’s global liberal cultural order, priorities such as “traveling the world, achieving material success, and/or finding oneself” often take precedence over starting a family and raising children. (Additionally, for many, finding a partner with whom to build a family remains a significant psychological and sociological challenge.) Nevertheless, Russia has the potential to be a conservative avant-garde in combating the liberal promotion of an atomized, individualistic life because social, cultural, and media institutions actively promote family values. Of course, as previously mentioned, many Russians live lives very similar to average liberal Westerners, as sociological research and travel across Russia demonstrate.
Russia’s Turn to Western Values Resulted in a Demographic Crisis
The reasons for this trend may lie in long-standing historical structures—not only the decades-long desire of Russia to be part of the liberal West after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War but also centuries-long orientation toward Western Europe. This is evident in:
- Peter I Romanov and the establishment of Imperial Russia, which emulated contemporary Western absolutist monarchies and established marital ties between European and Russian aristocracies over the centuries;
- The Bolshevik revolutions of 1917, led by Lenin who came from the West, which destroyed traditional Russian values and institutions while implementing a Western socialist-communist ideology based on Karl Marx’s teachings (Marx had not envisioned a proletarian revolution in Russia, which at the time had a feudal system with serfs, not proletarians);
- The liberal political elites around Yeltsin and his “Family” in the 1990s, which liberalized Russian life and caused chaos and catastrophic outcomes for Russian citizens;
- Vladimir Putin’s pragmatic cooperation with the West, which lasted until 2022, when Russia became isolated by the West and had to confront profoundly difficult questions: Who are we Russians? What is our path and way of life? What are our intrinsic ideological frameworks, independent of Western influence?
Demographics Affect External Vulnerability
Demographic measures also have limited impact in poorer regions without access to high-quality public services. Therefore, Russia must consider and implement reforms in healthcare, education, labor policy, and other public policies that are contextually unique to Russia and its civilizational concept. Demographic issues raise concerns not only for domestic stability but also for security implications. Some Western researchers point out that Russia’s growing economic dependence on China—through trade, labor, and investment—fuels fears of a “silent colonization,” while issues of trust with Chinese partners remain (Aguiar, 2025; Tselichtchev, 2017). At the same time, Russia balances tactical partnership with China amid military-political tensions with the United States and Japan. The territorial dispute with Japan over the Southern Kurils remains unresolved and hinders deeper Russo-Japanese cooperation, although economic interests, particularly in fisheries and energy, occasionally transcend diplomatic barriers. Diplomatically, Russia can be described in two words: pragmatism (focused on national interests) and improvisation (adapting to new contingent conditions in international relations).
The Pacific as the Geopolitical Gateway to Russia’s Future
The importance of the Russian Federation in the Pacific is also visible through the forum held since 2015 in Vladivostok—the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) (Восточный экономический форум), under the auspices of the Russian president. The forum was initiated to promote the Russian Far East as an investment destination and as a geopolitical platform for engaging Asia-Pacific powers. EEF brings together political and business leaders from China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India, and other ASEAN countries, strengthening Russia’s regional presence through economic initiatives and soft power. The forum is not limited to economic topics; it also serves as a channel for regional security and infrastructure cooperation, as evidenced by participation from high-level delegations.
The Russian president often uses the forum to announce new strategic projects—from energy corridors and ports to digital transformation and educational partnerships—highlighting the Far East as a geopolitical gateway for Russia’s Pacific strategy. However, geopolitical realities—particularly the conflict in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and increasing caution from Asian partners—have limited the forum’s effectiveness as a tool for deeper integration. The number of Western participants has drastically declined since 2022, while Asian partners balance their interests against reputational risk. Nevertheless, Western literature warns that the EEF is moving toward “regional networking in isolation,” whereas Russian analysts emphasize its long-term importance for the multipolar restructuring of the global economy (Timofejev, 2023). Additionally, participation in Russian economic and social forums increasingly demonstrates ways to bypass sanctions imposed by Western actors: “When politics builds walls, money finds windows and doors. Participation in economic forums worldwide is even promoted by the European Union through its internationalization projects (though currently likely not in Russia), as it recognizes the importance of promoting European products, still accessible to Russian citizens because sanctions have been bypassed for years. Sanctions are walls erected by states, but money always finds paths for multiplication” (Rukavina, 2025b).
Between Ambitions and Limitations
The Pacific represents more than just a geographic space for Russia—it is a projection of its geopolitical ambitions and a reflection of certain internal weaknesses, such as demographics. While the Pacific Fleet and energy projects signal Russia’s desire for strategic positioning in Asia, demographic and infrastructure weaknesses, uncertain relations with neighbors, and unresolved territorial disputes limit the reach of these ambitions.
In the context of a multipolar world, the Pacific and the Far Eastern Federal District become arenas where Russia must simultaneously balance military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions of its identity—between current European continental isolation and potential future Pacific maritime integration or a possible tripolar balance (Tripolarity or Tripolarism; Russian: Триполярность or Триполяризм) of the United States, China, and Russia. In this sense, Russia’s presence in the Pacific is a test of the maturity and long-term viability of its national and civilizational foreign policy and security strategy.
Spec. pol. Bruno Rukavina is a specialist in foreign policy and diplomacy and a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.
References:
Aguiar, Paulo (2025) China’s Quiet Threat to Russia: Espionage Rattles the Far East. Geopolitical Monitor. Available at: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/chinas-quiet-threat-to-russia-espionage-rattles-the-far-east/
Ivolgin, Artem (2025) Population Census Results: Key Findings by Cities, Regions, and Districts. Available at: https://t-j.ru/perepis-2021/
Okean (2025) All-Russian Children’s Center “Okean”. Available at: https://okean.org/
Rukavina, Bruno (2025) Destroyed Trust: Why the West and Russia Cannot Trust Each Other? Geopolitika News. Available at: https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/bismarck-je-znao-odgovor-tajna-uspjeha-u-politici-dobar-dogovor-s-rusijom/
Rukavina, Bruno (2025a) Trump-Putin Meeting: Search for Peace: Mountains Trembled, the Russian Bear Returned. Geopolitika News. Available at: https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/sastanak-trump-putin-potraga-za-mirom-tresla-se-brda-vratio-se-ruski-medvjed/
Rukavina, Bruno (2025b) Paradox: While Politics Hits Moscow with Devastating Sanctions, Western Companies Are Ubiquitous in Russia. Geopolitika News. Available at: https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/paradoks-dok-politika-razornim-sankcijama-udara-moskvu-zapadne-tvrtke-sveprisutne-u-rusiji/
Tselichtchev, Ivan (2017) Chinese in the Russian Far East: a Geopolitical Time Bomb? South China Morning Post. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2100228/chinese-russian-far-east-geopolitical-time-bomb
