By Matija Šerić
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been an international hotspot and one of the most politically unstable areas in the already fragile Western Balkans for three decades. After the bloody war, from 1996 until today, a new war between the three ethnic communities has unfolded—fortunately only political. Some analysts refer to this situation as a “cold war.” In fact, all three sides treated the Dayton Peace Agreement as a temporary solution, believing that over time it would produce an outcome different from what was formally signed. This is not surprising, given that the Americans, as the main architects of Bosnia’s political system in November 1995, explained the Dayton framework to each side in the way they wanted to hear it. Serbs were promised strong autonomy for the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, possibly even future secession; Bosniaks were promised an intact Bosnia that would gradually become centralized and unitary; and Croats were promised full equality with Bosniaks in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and special ties with Croatia.
Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Failed Protectorate
Over time, foreigners, through the Office of the High Representative, did in fact modify Dayton Bosnia according to their own preferences. However, despite pumping billions of dollars into NGOs and implementing certain structural changes, Bosnia has not become any more stable in 2025 than it was in the late 1990s. On the contrary, one could argue that the situation has worsened. In the immediate post-war years, there was moderate optimism, and citizens looked to the future without conflict. Over time, however, the country fell into apathy and hopelessness, largely due to interventions by the protectorate. To make matters worse, during the 2020s, calls for war, mobilization, and secession of parts of the country became a reality that the public gradually accepted, while Bosnia descended into crime, corruption, and deep poverty, with around one million people living in destitution.
Electoral Law as a “Godsend”?
Over the last decade, domestic and foreign actors have focused on changing the electoral law so that all three constituent peoples could elect their legitimate representatives. This is allegedly the key to transforming the Bosnian state for the better. According to local and foreign officials, expectations are that after such a reform, Bosnia would experience a near “renaissance.” However, even if the electoral law were amended to be broadly acceptable to representatives of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, it would not stabilize the country as long as it continues to be based on post-Dayton principles and foreign intervention.
A good example is the so-called Mostar Agreement of 2020, in which HDZ BiH and SDA agreed on the city’s electoral system. Thanks to this agreement, elections were held after 12 years—but what changed in practice? Aside from the fact that elections now take place, nothing. They turned into fierce political battles—not over programs to improve citizens’ lives, but essentially as a political census. Croats and Bosniaks vote overwhelmingly for their own candidates simply to ensure that one of their compatriots becomes mayor. The citizens of Mostar do not live any better today than ten years ago. Perhaps they even live worse. This shows that Bosnia needs a thorough reconstruction based not on national conflicts but on national compromise and, above all, reconciliation.
Unitarism and Separatism – Solutions That Are Not
If Bosnia wants to become stable and sustainable, it must reject the Dayton framework and find a new path. The solution is certainly not a “civic,” unitary-centralist Bosnia based on one person, one vote, because that would lead to the dominance of the Bosniak population. This resembles Milošević’s rhetoric in the 1980s or the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1930s, when Serbs dominated. Nor is the solution the independence of the Republika Srpska and its annexation to Serbia, as that would heighten insecurity in the Western Balkans and strengthen separatist movements in neighboring countries. Serbia controlling areas up to Šipovo and Istočni Drvar would seriously destabilize Croatia and lay the groundwork for further conflicts.
Federalization as the Only Viable Solution
The only viable solution that can create a functional and long-term sustainable Bosnia and Herzegovina is a full and thorough federalization of the country. The Dayton framework must be discarded, and a new sustainable framework created for decades—or even centuries—to come. From the existing framework, only the country’s external borders and constituent peoples need to be retained (possibly even vehicle license plates); everything else should be built from scratch. Bosnia’s puzzle is complex but absolutely solvable.
First and foremost, the current entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska—must be abolished. Both have proven politically unstable and dysfunctional, economically mired in poverty, demographically fractured, culturally neglected, and geographically and infrastructurally illogical. The very existence of these two entities is not politically wise given the three constituent peoples, highlighting the national character in one entity and a geographic one in the other.
What Federalism Is and Isn’t
Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized on federal principles—a constitutional order in which state power is divided between a federal government and federal units (cantons, districts, regions) with significant autonomy. Examples of successful federal states include the United States, Russia, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that federalism would destroy Bosnia. On the contrary, federalism is the path to recovery.
How a Federal Republic of Bosnia Would Look
Bosnia and Herzegovina should be structured as a federal republic guaranteeing equality of all three peoples while enabling the smooth day-to-day functioning of the state—meaning fast and effective decision-making by competent institutions. This can be achieved by creating a strong central government in Sarajevo with a single cabinet and prime minister. Bosnia should consist of federal units with significant autonomy, and municipalities and cities should serve as local levels of governance.
8–12 Federal Units
Given its area of 51,209 square kilometers, Bosnia should ideally have between 8 and 12 federal units—large cantons, macro-regions, provinces, or districts (the name is less important). Some units would be national, others multi-ethnic, depending on the population. Historical, cultural, economic, geographic, and infrastructural factors should guide the creation of units—not solely war-era divisions or ethnic criteria. Ethnicity is important but not the only factor.
Federal Level – Parity, Vetoes, and National Parliaments
The state government and parliament would be elected in general elections, with federal unit boundaries serving as electoral districts—an excellent way to prevent gerrymandering. The president, with mainly symbolic powers, would be elected by parliament, preventing any one group from dominating.
The federal government would have parity among the three national groups (33–33–33%). For example, ministries could be divided 5:5:5 among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, with at least one seat reserved for national minorities. Decisions would require a two-thirds majority of ministers from each constituent people.
In addition to the federal parliament, there would be national parliaments for each constituent people, similar to today’s Houses of Peoples but with greater powers. Each national parliament could veto federal government decisions to protect vital national interests (e.g., vetoing a highway route or waste facility in areas inhabited by a specific group).
Functional Regional Level
Regional governments would follow the same principles as the state level for multi-ethnic regions, with parity in leadership (50–50% for two groups, 33–33–33% for three). Regional presidents would serve mainly procedural roles. Each multi-ethnic federal unit would also have national parliaments with veto power, somewhat mirroring the UN Security Council system.
Federal units would have significant autonomy in finance, infrastructure, education, healthcare, law enforcement, culture, and sports. Decentralization would strengthen, not weaken, the state, ensured through constitutional safeguards preventing regions from becoming quasi-states while keeping important powers at the federal level.
Support from Croats and Bosniaks is Essential
The federalist vision can only succeed if supported by Croat and Bosniak intellectual elites, then political structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia as an EU and NATO member. Croatia could help integrate Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Serb representatives would naturally resist, aiming for the disintegration of Bosnia to enable a Greater Serbia. However, if two of the three peoples embrace federalism and gain Croatian support, they could launch a diplomatic campaign to convince the U.S. and EU to abandon Dayton and create conditions for a new, more successful Bosnia. Later, some Bosnian Serbs could be brought on board. Given opposition from Serbia, the U.S. would need to strongly back such a plan, potentially supported by Brussels, London, Ankara, Beijing, and other global powers.
A Sovereign State, Not a Protectorate
Following structural reform, Bosnia should function as a sovereign state, not a protectorate. The Office of the High Representative and foreign judges in the Constitutional Court should be abolished, and Bosnia should rapidly join the EU and NATO. Opposition from Bosnian Serbs and Serbia could be mitigated by deploying UN or NATO peacekeepers and potential sanctions on Serbia if it interferes. Bosnian Serbs would eventually accept the reform once they see economic progress and national equality in a multinational state. Some may privately support a normal Bosnia but are constrained by dominant anti-Bosnian sentiments.
A Bilateral Bosnia-Croatia Alliance
The Federal Republic of Bosnia should form a political alliance with Croatia, similar to the Visegrad Group or the UK–US “special relationship.” Both would remain independent, sovereign states but collaborate on political, economic, customs, infrastructure, cultural, and other levels. This alliance would counter Greater Serbian tendencies and ensure a functional Bosnia.
The two states could share a common currency (the euro), allowing Bosnia to join the Eurozone. Open borders would improve trade and infrastructure, including energy, rail, and road networks. For example, an A1 highway from Zagreb to Split via Bihać, continuing to Livno, Trebinje, and Montenegro, would optimize transit, reducing detours through Croatia. Cross-border personal goods transport should be unrestricted to support economic integration.
From Crisis Zone to Regional Economic Driver
A functional federal Bosnia would close a geopolitical hotspot in Southeast Europe, providing momentum for the wider post-Yugoslav region. It could serve as a model for resolving multi-ethnic state issues like Kosovo and Cyprus. Although this solution is not currently on the table, it should be considered if Bosnia’s political actors aim to preserve the state and achieve prosperity for their citizens.
