Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the most complicated countries in the world due to its mixed national and religious composition. The Bosnian crisis has lasted for 35 years, and its end is nowhere in sight. Thirty years after the end of the bloody war, there is still no consensus among the political elite about what BiH should look like as a state (or whether it should even exist at all). The present and future of BiH are completely uncertain, as is the specific position of BiH Croats. We discussed these heated issues with political scientist and former journalist Mr. Sc. Tvrtko Milović.

– How do you view the current heated political situation in BiH, taking into account the verdict against Milorad Dodik and the (im)possibility of forming a new government at the state level?

I see it as the culmination of a clash between three political philosophies in BiH. I believe BiH had a chance to build a functional system until 2000, when all three sides were trying to build some trust, the country was being rebuilt, and there was interest in compromise. The verdict against Milorad Dodik, and everything behind it, is just a continuation of political conflicts that have lasted for 20 years, now transferred into the judicial system, which has essentially become another political battleground. The inability to form a new parliamentary majority is the least of our problems. We are now facing the fact that Republika Srpska has de facto declared independence.

– Is it possible for Dodik to be arrested by international forces, EUFOR or someone else?

Theoretically, it is possible if he agrees to it himself. But you should know that even his arrest wouldn’t change anything, because he has only been summoned for questioning. In the worst-case scenario, he could be detained for a month. This is about his conflict with the BiH judiciary in which he is demonstrating power. In other words, he is sending a message that they can’t do anything to him. And indeed, they can’t. EUFOR’s mission is peacekeeping. If they were to arrest a legitimately elected high-ranking political official, they would directly disrupt peace, so that will not happen. And no other enforcement body has the power to arrest him. So, there will be no arrest.

– How do you assess the current political position of Croats in BiH, especially in the context of the electoral reform that isn’t happening?

It depends on the perspective. The fact that there is absolute national consensus on the need to amend the electoral law is a good thing. However, the entire political and social life is held hostage by this one issue. As a community, we have stagnated for the past 15 years waiting for this humiliating situation to change. In my opinion, the Croatian elite in BiH has positioned itself correctly in this latest crisis with Dodik, by conditioning any cooperation on changes to the electoral law. But the result of all this is that we have learned that for the Bosniaks, it is more important to impose a Croat member of the Presidency than to save BiH from institutional and functional collapse. That is a sad realization.
That is why we are nowhere near the peak of the crisis. It is yet to come.

– Why do you emphasize that Croats in (Central) Bosnia are the most important? Why do you think their position is more difficult than in Herzegovina? Is it because of the mixed ethnic structure or something else?

I don’t think that Croats in Central Bosnia are more important than any others. It’s just that their position is more important for BiH than anyone else’s. The only truly multiethnic area in BiH is the current territory of the Central Bosnia Canton. Its multiethnicity is defined by the 30% of Croats living in the canton. If this structure were to collapse for any reason, ethnic boundaries in BiH would become so clearly drawn that its disintegration along ethnic lines would be only a matter of time.

That is why I believe the political and economic preservation of the Croats of Central Bosnia is the most important issue for the survival of BiH. It reveals who truly cares about BiH and who seeks domination. The overall Croatian politics in BiH is, in a way, a hostage to the position of the Croats in Central Bosnia. If that factor did not exist, the Croats of Herzegovina would very easily turn toward separatism.

– What do you think about the position of Croats outside the Central Bosnia Canton? I believe Croats in Vareš, Žepče, Usora, Posavina, and in majority Bosniak urban areas such as Zenica, Tuzla, and Sarajevo are also important. The question is how many of these urban Croats are still left.

All are equally important — as people, as citizens, and as Croats. It is dangerous to rank Croats by importance, yet this is constantly being imposed on Croats. If anyone is left out of political solutions, accusations of “betraying” certain Croats automatically follow…
Personally, I think a territorial approach should be avoided because it inevitably leads us to situations where we have to explain why we “forgot” some Croats somewhere… Croats are not seeking any solution that would put anyone in a worse position than they currently are. On the contrary, Croats are fighting for state mechanisms that would allow them equal protection throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And I’ll also address the number of “urban Croats,” as you call them.
In the past 10 years, the Croatian population has been undergoing accelerated urbanization. Villages are dying out while young couples mostly choose to live in urban centers. If you looked at the urbanization of people under the age of 40, you’d see that Croats are highly urban. So the “loss” of Croats in major urban centers like Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla has been “compensated” by the overall urbanization of the Croatian population in smaller towns.

– Let’s leave current events aside and return to the question of what kind of Bosnia should exist, which has been the core question for the past 30 years. In my opinion, BiH was wrongly structured from the start with the Dayton framework of two entities, and all subsequent interventions by the international community from 2000 onwards have turned BiH into a monstrosity. Despite billions of dollars being poured into it, I believe there is no salvation without a thorough reconstruction. In my view — although not realistic at this moment — the foundation (state borders and three constituent peoples) should be retained, but everything else (RS and FBiH) should be abolished, and BiH should be built from scratch on a federalist model. The strongest countries in the world, like the USA and Russia, are federal states. What do you think about that?

There is a whole spectrum of theoretical solutions, including the one you mentioned. Unfortunately, the structure of states is rarely determined by theory — it is usually dictated by geopolitical reality. In our region, states have always been created and destroyed as part of broader geostrategic changes. That will be the case in the future as well.
BiH could be structured in various ways. That would require the three ethnic elites to reach a compromise about what kind of state BiH should be. Dodik has proposed such offers several times. Croats always keep that offer on the table. But Bosniaks refuse to accept that Serbs and Croats should have any say in the state’s structure, let alone in defining what BiH should look like. So it’s an illusion to expect any Bosniak representatives to engage in such discussions.
I can only offer my opinion, as you did, but believe me — the fate of BiH is more influenced by the speed of the Russian offensive in Donbas than by the will of all BiH citizens combined.

– In that context, I believe we shouldn’t insist on a third (Croatian) entity (which Bosniak nationalists firmly reject) but instead try to organize BiH based on national and multiethnic (greater) cantons, provinces, districts, or counties… Perhaps 8–12 federal units. With quality parity and veto mechanisms in government, parliament, and other bodies, the political rights of all three peoples could be protected. The Catholic Church advocated for something similar and never accepted the idea of a Croatian entity because many Catholics and church properties would be left outside of it. Such a federalist solution could be promoted by Croatian lobbyists abroad, and Croatia and BiH Croats could score political points. We all know that Bosniak and Serb nationalists promote unitarism and secessionism.

Croats in BiH have always adapted their political aspirations to reality, meaning to what they believe the other side might somehow accept. However, on the other side, we do not have a counterpart who adheres to reality. On that side, we have a partner who sticks to the idea of what the state “should be.” And anything that doesn’t fit into that idea is unacceptable to them.
Croats want compromise, while Bosniaks refuse to compromise on their vision of the state.
But if we are to speak of an acceptable solution for Croats, I believe the most important thing is to create conditions for democracy to develop among Croats. We can achieve that only through a bicameral system, which doesn’t necessarily have to be territorial. Or to simplify, Croats benefit from either territorial federalism or constitutional consociation. Consistent, of course. We are now caught between those two principles. To some extent, we have consociation, but we are deceived through the electoral system. Similarly, the Federation of BiH is a federation of cantons, but not in the full sense. Everything is half-baked and flawed. But again, I repeat — none of us really gets a say, so we should approach these topics more casually.

– In your opinion, what should a Croatian entity look like? The main problem is determining borders with the Bosniak entity. That’s precisely why I believe a consociational solution is welcome.

First and foremost, if there were a third entity that is Croatian, it would have to encompass virtually the entire ethnic area where Croats live. This, for example, includes half of Tuzla municipality and fragments of ten to twenty municipalities where Croats have vital communities. At the same time, areas with a non-Croat majority would have to be left to the other entities. I don’t even want to imagine the chaos that would result from such map-drawing, especially considering what I said about Croats in Central Bosnia or those in Žepče, Vareš, and other places you mentioned.

That’s why such an entity would have to be civic-based. But how do you create a civic-based third entity when the first two are already nationally defined?
I don’t believe such development is even possible. I think BiH is closer to complete disintegration than to a three-entity solution. All the more so because a new entity would require compromise, and as I’ve said, that’s unimaginable.
Disintegration requires no compromise, which is why it is more likely.
And yes, consociation is the best solution. But the issue is that it too requires compromise. And you try achieving compromise with a politics that has been electing Komšić for 20 years, considers that its right, and treats any criticism of it as an insult and fascism.

– When it comes to drawing maps of three entities, is the option of relocating the population possible—for example, Croats from Central Bosnia moving to Herzegovina, and Bosniaks from Herzegovina moving to Central Bosnia? Some would say that was the intention of Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović. I mention this in the context of Trump’s plan to relocate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Clearly, such ideas are no longer unthinkable, and it’s not impossible that Trump or some global leader might one day propose a similar plan for the Croat-Bosniak knot.

Population relocations are clearly no longer taboo this year, as they were until last year. But it must be kept in mind that collective migrations of people are only possible under extraordinary—and specifically wartime—circumstances. I would rule that out as a possibility. At this moment, there is no institution of coercion that could physically force anyone to move where they do not want to go. And there is also no possibility of voluntary relocation, because like war, such processes are costly. And we don’t even have enough money for pensions.

If we look at the historical context of this topic, there certainly were discussions about it. But those discussions were shaped by the immediate situation on the frontlines. You may know that Croatia, immediately after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and Metohija, systematically relocated the remaining Croats from Kosovo to Croatia. That was a form of care by Croatia for its compatriots. It’s fairly well known that similar plans existed for the Croats of Central Bosnia to simplify the military-political situation. Today, such relocations, even if they were to occur, would practically change nothing—because Bosniak politics considers both Posušje, where there are no Bosniaks, and Kakanj, where Croats struggle to elect even a single councilor, equally as its own territory. So I would say that not only is that option impossible, but in the current context, it makes no sense whatsoever.

– Is a new war in Bosnia and Herzegovina possible? The dark clouds of war have never fully cleared from above BiH.

They haven’t cleared in the minds of some. One must understand that after the war, among the Bosniaks a belief developed that their military victory had been taken away from them—unlike the victory Croatia achieved. Because of that, there is still a sentiment that the war should be continued so that victory can be achieved and their vision of a Bosnian state realized.

But when we talk about war from a military standpoint—it is impossible. First and foremost—war is expensive. And no one in BiH has money for war. If we assume someone from outside would finance the war, we then run into logistical problems. Namely, the Bosniak side throughout the last war—even during the conflict with the Croats—had supplies coming from Croatia. Now I see no reason for Croatia to be involved in any future war, let alone support Bosniak unitarist ambitions.

Third, BiH no longer has any demographic potential for conflict. In the last war, the entire adult male population had at least some military training. Today, we not only lack population numbers, but the age-eligible population is not usable for conflict—at least not in the way it was in the last war.

Even the current Armed Forces of BiH cannot form the basis of conflict in the way the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) once did. It’s important to know that JNA’s personnel and equipment formed the foundation for the early stages of the war. Today, the Armed Forces of BiH can barely assemble, so depleted they are by sick leaves and days off. And finally, everyone in peacetime is ready to die for something. But when the moment comes to risk your life for the most miserable and pitiful state in Europe, I don’t think the number of enthusiasts would fill even three brigades.

So, sleep peacefully.

– Are you satisfied with the Republic of Croatia’s treatment of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina in recent years during the term of Andrej Plenković?

I think that relationship doesn’t really exist. What does exist is the relationship between the Croatian HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) and the HDZ BiH, and as we can see, that relationship functions smoothly. The core of that relationship is their management of the funds allocated for aid to Croats outside Croatia, which HDZ essentially uses to buy the electoral will of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of these projects are trivial, and given that the same people always control those funds, you can guess how much of that money ends up in individual pockets.

Beyond that, Croats in BiH mean as much to Plenković as three parliamentary seats.

However, we shouldn’t be entirely critical. When we compare the approach of previous governments to the position of Croats in BiH, Plenković’s approach is consistent and does represent important support for us. Nowhere near what it should be, but better than it was.

Interview conducted by Matija Šerić.