Global news is dominated daily by reports of wars in Ukraine and the Holy Land, while many other conflicts, such as those in Myanmar and Sudan, are barely mentioned. Wars are a harsh reality. International relations are burdened by the rivalry between major powers—the USA, Russia, and China. Conflicts between great powers threaten to trigger a third world war that could destroy humanity. We spoke on these complex global security issues with Dr. Marinko Ogorec, a former Croatian military attaché in Russia and an expert in military affairs.
– How do you view the current state of global security? Crises, conflicts, and wars have become everyday occurrences. At first glance, 2025 bears some resemblance to 1925. Although the world is making drastic technological and scientific progress, wars seem far from over.
The situation on a global level is very turbulent, with unexpected twists and uncertain outcomes caused by key factors in international relations. Crises, conflicts, and wars have been a constant in human societal development from its earliest days to the present. Unfortunately, nothing has changed for the better in that regard. We can conclude that the development of human civilization has always been a cycle of war and peace, with all the changes such situations bring. Regarding the comparison between 1925 and the present day, I’m not sure how valid that is. I’m not a supporter of the idea that history repeats itself—such repetition is impossible due to the evolution of human society in technological, sociological, cultural, and all other aspects. We can recognize similar situations that tend to have similar outcomes, but these always occur within different contexts of international relations, with new laws and patterns of development. Wars have been a part of human civilization and a part of power politics since the rise of the earliest states. It is unlikely they will disappear anytime soon, regardless of humanity’s progress, increased social awareness, or empathy. Every state, nation, or smaller ethnic group must be prepared to defend its integrity and freedom, as long as nation-states remain the fundamental subjects of international relations and international law.
– Are we living in geopolitical circumstances that could be described as Cold War 2.0? On one side, Russia, China, and their partners such as North Korea and Iran, and on the other, NATO and its allies like Japan and South Korea?
Actually, we are living in a significantly more turbulent and dynamic period than the so-called “Cold War.” During the Cold War, there was a clear bipolar division and a well-defined balance between dominant global powers, based on a “balance of terror” due to their mutual possession of nuclear arsenals capable of multiple global destructions. Today, we are witnessing a redefinition of international relations, the reshaping of global spheres of interest, and a shift from bipolar to multipolar balance. Three major powers dominate the global stage—China, the USA, and Russia—and increasingly, India appears poised to claim great-power status. Throughout history, humanity has developed theories and rules about bipolarity, notably in Hans Morgenthau’s realist theory of international relations. But now, with more players involved, the world must adjust to a multipolar balance of power. Time will tell how successful that process will be.
– Is a global Third World War a real possibility, or are we only likely to see proxy wars like those in Syria and Ukraine?
Unfortunately, escalation of existing conflicts—particularly the war in Ukraine—into a larger war that could end in a third world war is always a possibility. It’s important to note that any nation possessing nuclear weapons, if facing existential threat or the risk of vanishing from the global political stage, would likely use such weapons despite knowing the global consequences. Therefore, it is essential to stop ongoing wars as soon as possible (not necessarily end them), in order to create a platform for diplomatic conflict resolution—albeit with significant compromises by the warring sides.
– Before February 24, 2022, did you expect Russia to launch a conventional invasion of Ukraine? Did you see any early signs in the 2000s during your time as Croatia’s military attaché in Russia?
Unfortunately, even just before the start of the Russian invasion, I believed it wouldn’t happen. My reasoning was that Russia had not deployed enough troops for such a large-scale invasion. A country as large as Ukraine, with over 40 million people, cannot be invaded with just over 150,000 troops, as Russia initially committed. President Putin seemingly acted based on severely flawed assessments of the situation and an inaccurate perception of Ukraine. If it’s true that Russian officers brought parade uniforms with them in anticipation of a victory march in Kyiv, that speaks volumes about the disastrous miscalculation of the entire operation. During the 2000s, the Russian armed forces faced serious issues inherited from the Soviet era and worsened during the social instability of the Yeltsin years. There were no significant signs of an imperial agenda in Ukraine back then.
– How do you assess Russia’s military achievements in Ukraine? Although they’ve taken about 20% of Ukrainian territory, they haven’t fully captured the four annexed regions (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk). Nor have they seized regions like Kharkiv or Odesa or linked up with pro-Russian Transnistria in Moldova. This seems underwhelming for the world’s second-largest military power.
It’s very difficult to determine Russia’s current war objectives in Ukraine. Initially, it seemed they were pursuing a full invasion—overthrowing the government and installing a pro-Russian regime. Since that didn’t happen, the Russian leadership had to redefine its political goals. Their current aims are unclear, although President Putin’s interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson—where he said everything east of the Dnipro was historically Russian and everything west was Polish—could be seen as an indirect hint. Whether Russia once planned to link its forces in Ukraine with those in Transnistria and undermine Moldovan sovereignty is no longer relevant, as that is currently not feasible.
– Based on available online information, Putin has mostly deployed troops from eastern Siberia and the Far East (Buryatia, Tuva, Yakutia), the Caucasus (Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria), the Wagner Group, and various mercenaries. Is Russia’s limited military success due to avoiding sending troops from major cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg, instead relying on the periphery?
What’s more important is how Russian forces are staffed. After suffering heavy losses among their elite troops early in the war, Russia began replenishing its units with prisoners and convicts. Current data shows around 180,000 prison spaces have been freed. Russia also runs aggressive recruitment campaigns targeting volunteers for its war efforts, offering enticing conditions. In addition, a partial mobilization took place, largely affecting non-Russian conscripts from remote areas of the Russian Federation. As for military success, Russian forces currently maintain the initiative and are slowly, though very gradually, making strategic gains in Ukraine.
– In your view, how much of Ukraine would Russia have conquered if the US and EU had not provided such extensive aid—$394 billion in total by the end of 2024, including military, humanitarian, and other assistance?
It is now obvious that Ukraine would have long since surrendered without this extensive Western support. And it’s not just about material and logistical aid, but also intelligence, long-range weapon targeting, and satellite battlefield surveillance. A good example is the weeklong suspension of US support during the Trump-Zelensky Oval Office standoff, during which Ukrainian forces were crushed around Kursk. This illustrates how crucial Western backing is.
– How do you assess the involvement of North Korean troops in the Russia-Ukraine war? Reports suggest they’ve been deployed in the Kursk region and suffered heavy losses, being unprepared for modern warfare like drone combat.
North Korea hasn’t participated in any serious military operation since the Korean War (1950–1953), which is a very long period without combat experience. It seems President Kim Jong Un and President Putin agreed to send North Korean troops to Russia—ostensibly as military assistance, but in reality to gain exposure to modern warfare. Survivors are expected to transfer that experience to the rest of North Korea’s military. Apparently, a major rotation has already occurred, with surviving soldiers being replaced. Whether this practice continues remains to be seen.
– Is Ukraine’s strategy of attacking Russian border regions rational? It seems wasteful in terms of money, manpower, and equipment, especially since they will likely have to return any captured territory. During Croatia’s Homeland War, Croatian forces never entered Serbia or Montenegro, nor did we bomb those areas, even though we could have. Zelensky and his generals appear to have made a poor decision, given the recent debacle in Kursk.
Any comparison between Croatia’s Homeland War and the conflict in Ukraine is inappropriate. The only similarity is that both involve brutal aggression from a superior force. Otherwise, each war unfolded within its own unique set of historical, social, cultural, and political circumstances. The Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region of Russia has baffled me from the start. The only militarily relevant objectives could have been control of the Kursk nuclear plant or diverting Russian forces from the main fronts in Ukraine. Neither goal came close to being achieved, so this operation appears to have been politically motivated for propaganda purposes—and suffered a severe military defeat as a result.
– In your opinion, what is the most realistic outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war? I personally think the front lines will eventually be frozen, with each side holding its current territory. Russia will keep its gains de facto (though not de jure), and Ukraine will have to give up NATO membership. Do you agree?
As of now, there’s no end or ceasefire in sight, unfortunately. Former US President Trump has been actively trying to end hostilities, and thanks to his initiative, negotiations have at least begun. American negotiators seem focused on achieving a ceasefire and halting military operations at the current front lines. If that happens, the groundwork might be laid for future diplomatic resolutions and an acceptable peace—though it will require significant concessions from both sides, likely far more painful for Ukraine. I completely agree that Ukraine would likely have to give up NATO membership in such a scenario.
Interview conducted by Matija Šerić.
Featured image: www.kasonline.eu
