By Ivan Toth
Amphibious Landing, 19 February 1945
During the night, a large naval force of carriers and escorts, Task Force 58 under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, arrived at Iwo Jima. Also in this fleet was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, overall commander of the invasion, who was aboard the flagship, the heavy cruiser Indianapolis. Smith once again expressed his frustration and disappointment over the fact that Mitscher’s group had bombed the Japanese home islands instead of bombarding and “softening” Japanese defenses on Iwo Jima. Unlike the day before the landing, the weather on the day of the assault was clear and bright, and at 08:59—one minute ahead of schedule—the first wave of Marines landed on the southern shore of Iwo Jima.
The planners of the operation in Pearl Harbor had completely misjudged the situation, to the misfortune of the forces landing under General Schmidt. Instead of the beaches described as “excellent and suitable for easy landing,” the Marines, once ashore, were met with deposits of black volcanic ash 4.5 meters deep. The ash made it impossible to safely remain on the beach or build protective trenches; yet it partially helped the Marines by limiting the effectiveness of Japanese artillery fire. The Japanese nonetheless pressured the Americans with intense fire from howitzers and rifles as the Americans gradually amassed equipment and personnel on the beach. The weak Japanese counterattack during the landing led the Navy to conclude that the bombardment had softened the Japanese defenses; meanwhile, General Kuribayashi was preparing a much stronger response. After allowing the Americans to build up men and equipment on the beach, he unleashed a massive force as part of his countermeasures. Shortly after 10:00, everything from machine guns and howitzers to heavy artillery opened fire on the beach packed with Americans.
The Marines’ Ordeal
Japanese heavy artillery on Mount Suribachi opened steel-reinforced doors to fire, then immediately shut them to prevent return fire from Marines and naval guns. This made it difficult for Americans to destroy Japanese artillery. Additional problems were the bunkers connected by a tunnel network, allowing bunkers cleared by flamethrowers and grenades to be reoccupied by soldiers moving through the tunnels.
This tactic caused large Marine casualties as they moved through the bunkers unaware they would be ambushed. In response to the stiff resistance on the beach, the Army’s 147th Infantry Regiment was tasked with climbing a ridge about ¾ of a mile from Mount Suribachi using ropes and climbing gear, with the aim of opening fire on the enemy to divert attention from the Marine landing zone. Pressured by heavy Japanese fire, the regiment soon became engaged in nonstop fighting that lasted for 31 days before they were replaced.
Moving Off the Beaches
LVT-1 amphibious tractors, known as “Amtracs,” could not traverse the volcanic ash; Marines had to disembark and advance on foot. Naval engineer battalion troops, despite enemy fire, managed to clear paths through obstacles so Marines and equipment could push forward and leave the fire zone on the beaches. Despite the success, the cost was high: in every shell hole lay at least one dead Marine. By 11:30, some Marines had reached the southern part of Airfield No. 1—a completely unrealistic objective set for the first day of the invasion. There they met fanatical Japanese soldiers engaging in hand-to-hand combat; the Marines repelled the attacks and held positions as night approached. In one of the sectors, the Americans managed to achieve a planned first-day objective.
In the far-right landing area, Japanese defensive positions at the Quarry dominated the terrain. The 25th Marine Regiment carried out two attacks to eliminate the guns. The 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines landed in the morning with about 900 men. Japanese resistance at the Quarry was so fierce that by nightfall only 150 men remained combat-ready—the rest were dead or wounded—an astonishing casualty rate of 83.3%. By evening, 30,000 Marines had landed, with another 40,000 preparing to land.
Sporadic Fighting
In the days after the landing, Marines expected the typical nighttime Japanese banzai attacks seen in earlier Pacific battles such as Saipan. These attacks usually resulted in massive Japanese losses and weakened their forces; Marines were well prepared for them. General Kuribayashi, however, strictly forbid banzai charges, considering them pointless.
Fighting on the beaches of Iwo Jima was intense. Progress was slowed by numerous fortified Japanese positions armed with artillery. Marines were often ambushed by Japanese soldiers emerging from tunnels; at night, the Japanese left their positions under cover of darkness to attack Marine trenches. The U.S. Navy countered this by firing illumination rounds and flares, denying the Japanese the advantage of darkness. On Iwo Jima and other Japanese-held islands, English-speaking soldiers were used as decoys to lure Marines—they would shout “corpsman,” pretending to be wounded to draw in a medic.
The Marines quickly realized their weapons were ineffective against entrenched Japanese forces, leading them to rely heavily—and successfully—on flamethrowers and grenades to flush them from tunnels. Each Marine platoon received an M2 flamethrower, plus a spare. Flamethrower operators were at higher risk because of the short range of their weapon and the bright flame exposing them to snipers. Despite the danger, the flamethrower was essential in breaking Japanese resistance. Another innovation, eight medium M4A3R3 Sherman tanks equipped with flamethrowers (“Ronson” or “Zippo tanks”), proved highly effective at clearing defenses. The Shermans were difficult to disable, forcing Japanese soldiers into open attacks in which they were outmatched by Marine firepower.
Close air support was initially provided by carrier-based fighters offshore; they were later replaced by the 15th Fighter Group flying P-51 Mustangs, which arrived on 6 March. Illumination rounds were first fired from ships and later from U.S. ground artillery. Navajo Code Talkers, equipped with walkie-talkies and SCR-610 backpack radios, played an important role in transmitting encrypted messages that supported the advance.
As water, food, and supplies dwindled, Japanese troops became desperate as the battle neared its end. Kuribayashi, a staunch opponent of banzai attacks, realized defeat was inevitable. Marines began facing increasing nighttime attacks; these were repelled mainly by a combination of machine-gun fire from defensive positions and artillery support. As Marines advanced, hand-to-hand combat became more frequent to repel desperate Japanese assaults. With the landing area secured, more men and heavy equipment poured ashore, and the invasion continued northward to capture the airfields and the rest of the island. Most Japanese soldiers fought to the death.
Raising the Flag on Mount Suribachi
“Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima” is the iconic black-and-white photograph taken by AP photographer Joe Rosenthal, showing six Marines from Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, raising the U.S. flag atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945. The photograph—capturing the second flag-raising—became extraordinarily popular, reproduced thousands of times, and later became the only photo to win the Pulitzer Prize in the same year it was published. It is considered one of the most significant and recognizable images of the war, and likely the most reproduced photograph of the era. Three of the six Marines in the photo were killed in subsequent fighting.
By the morning of 23 February 1945, the summit of Mount Suribachi was effectively cut off from the rest of the island. Marines knew the Japanese defenders had built an extensive underground network and that the volcano, despite being isolated from the mainland, remained connected through tunnels. They expected fierce resistance.
