By Ivan Toth

After the expansion of the war in the Pacific and the capture of Western strongholds, the Japanese Empire quickly achieved its initial goals, occupying the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia, which was important to Japan due to its oil resources) at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942. The second phase of operations began in January 1942. Although there were disagreements between the Japanese Army and Navy, Admiral Yamamoto managed to push through his plan.

Background of the Battle of Midway

Yamamoto’s original goal was to eliminate the American aircraft carriers, which he considered the main threat in the upcoming Pacific campaign; this became especially important after the attack on Tokyo on April 18, 1942, when 16 American B-25 Mitchell bombers from the USS Hornet bombed Tokyo and other cities in Japan. Although this attack had little military significance, it caused a major psychological shock to the Japanese and revealed a gap in the defensive perimeter around the Japanese islands as well as the accessibility of American bombers to Japanese territory. This and other “hit-and-run” raids conducted by American bombers in the South Pacific showed that the Americans remained a threat even though they were still refraining from full entry into the war.

Yamamoto believed that another air raid on the main U.S. naval base, Pearl Harbor, would force the Americans and their entire fleet to sortie, including the aircraft carriers and their escorts. Due to the strengthening of defensive positions and air bases in the Hawaiian Islands after the attack on December 7, 1941, Yamamoto judged it too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. Instead, he chose Midway, a small island (atoll) northeast of the Hawaiian island chain, about 1,300 miles from Oahu.

This meant that Midway was out of reach of all American aircraft carriers and their escorts stationed in Hawaii. Midway was not particularly important in Japanese plans, but the Japanese believed the Americans might consider Midway a key outpost for Pearl Harbor and would therefore be forced to defend it fiercely. And they were right: the Americans considered Midway key because it was a base for submarines that could operate beyond Pearl Harbor, using it for supply and operations, thus extending their operational radius to 1,200 miles. Besides serving as an air base, it was also a launch point for bombers attacking the Wake Islands.

Objective of the Midway Operation

The operation, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, aimed to eliminate the U.S. as a strategic power in the Pacific and enable Japan to have “free hands” in establishing the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Japan hoped that another defeat would demoralize the U.S. into surrendering in the Pacific War, thereby securing Japanese dominance. Luring American aircraft carriers into a trap and capturing the Midway Islands was part of a broader strategy to expand Japanese influence and consolidate defensive positions in response to the Doolittle Raid, the air raid on Tokyo.

This operation was considered preparation for further attacks on Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii. One of the main flaws in the plan was the Japanese misjudgment of the American reaction and poor initial positions for the attack. Most importantly, American intelligence managed to decrypt Japanese messages and learn the date and location of the planned attacks, allowing the U.S. Navy to prepare an ambush for the Japanese.

Admiral Yamamoto’s Plan

Yamamoto’s plan was extremely complex and required precise timing coordination of multiple combat groups scattered hundreds of miles across the open sea. His estimates were based on intelligence data suggesting that USS Enterprise and USS Hornet would be the only carriers with escorts available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea a month earlier, USS Lexington was sunk, and USS Yorktown was damaged so badly that the Japanese believed it was lost. After repairs at Pearl Harbor, USS Yorktown sailed and played a key role in detecting and destroying Japanese carriers and their escorts in the Battle of Midway.

Much of Yamamoto’s plan, which was shared by most of the Japanese leadership, was based on the mistaken assumption that the Americans’ morale had sunk after Japanese naval victories following Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto believed a ruse would be needed to lure the American fleet into a trap; therefore, he deployed his naval forces so that their full military strength would not be revealed to the Americans until the start of the battle.

Yamamoto’s battleships and cruisers followed Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s forces by a few hundred miles, and the Japanese land forces were to destroy what remained of the American navy after Nagumo’s forces sufficiently weakened it for an infantry landing. This was typical military doctrine of most naval powers at the time. What Yamamoto did not know was that the Americans had decrypted the main Japanese cipher. His insistence on dispersing his forces also meant that none of his formations were in a position to support each other.

Invasion of the Aleutians

To secure the Imperial Japanese Army’s support for operations at Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy agreed to assist in the invasion of the Aleutian Islands. The Japanese Army wanted to occupy the western Aleutians to deploy its forces and divert American bombers stationed at the base in Alaska. Japanese operations in the Aleutian Islands tied down additional ships that otherwise could have participated in the main strike force at Midway and thus helped the Japanese naval forces. Although many historians and earlier sources considered the Aleutian operation a feint to divert American forces, data that became available in the early 21st century indicates that the Aleutian invasion was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. The Aleutian operation was launched a day after the start of the Battle of Midway due to delays of Nagumo and his operational forces.

Forces Ratio before the Start of the Battle of Midway

The Japanese sailed with nearly the entire Imperial fleet: six aircraft carriers, 11 battleships, 13 cruisers, 45 destroyers, submarines, transport ships, and minesweepers. Despite the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942, which had no clear victor and represented a setback for Japan, Japan planned to capture the Midway Islands and American bases in the Aleutians. Confident that it could handle the weaker American Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku sent four aircraft carriers with orders to find and destroy the American fleet and capture Midway.

U.S. intelligence had decrypted Japanese messages and learned about the Japanese plan. The Americans had three aircraft carriers (USS Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet), eight cruisers, 14 destroyers, and an airfield on Midway. USS Yorktown, damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, was returned to service after repairs at Pearl Harbor. These ships were anchored about 350 miles northeast of Midway, waiting for the advance of Yamamoto’s fleet. Since the Japanese had no bases on the islands for air support, the Americans took advantage of this and established 115 bases on Midway and Hawaii, which they used for attacks.

Ivan Toth is a distinguished Croatian lawyer and social affairs analyst.